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Many casual observers of the American legal academy are aware of the sub-
stantial falloff in both the number and the conventional qualifications of appli-
cants to law school that began after 2010. But few appreciate how widespread 
and serious its effects have been. For the vast majority of law schools, those ef-
fects have been somewhere between significant and devastating. 
From academic years 2010–11 through 2016–17, the number of unique ap-
plicants to accredited law schools fell 36 percent, and the number of applications 
fell 44 percent, while students with the best conventional qualifications dispro-
portionately stayed away. The effects on the academy have been profound, and 
sectors of the academy distinguished by their relative overall reputation for 
quality have reacted differently. Beyond the strongest law schools, many shrank 
their entering classes by between a third and a half, and dropped 15 LSAT per-
centiles at the median. We estimate that aggregate annual tuition revenue for all 
accredited American law schools fell over $1.5 billion from its inflation-adjusted 
peak in 2011–12. 
Generally we found, as might be expected, that the weaker a law school’s 
relative reputation for overall quality (“Reputation”), the more difficulty it had 
attracting students with the credentials it sought, so that as Reputation decreased, 
entering-class credentials (“Profile”), entering-class Size, and average tuition 
actually paid (“Net Tuition”) also decreased. But this general and unsurprising 
finding came with some surprising variations and exceptions. These results lead 
to four observations with important implications for the legal academy: 
First, Reputationally Stronger law schools generally chose to preserve enter-
ing-class Profile, even when they had to shrink class Size or discount tuition to do 
so. This strategic drive to keep Profile up at the expense of Size meant thousands 
of viable candidates remained available to other law schools, effectively prevent-
ing the closing of as many as twenty Reputationally Weaker schools. 
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Second, by shrinking class Size and reducing Net Tuition to keep up their en-
tering-class Profile, many law schools sacrificed millions of dollars of Tuition 
Revenue. As a practical matter, then, law schools “invested” in Profile rather 
than in expanding their faculties, their facilities, or their access to clinical and 
experiential education. We encourage discussion of the implications of this in-
vestment choice. 
Third, some Reputationally Weaker law schools perversely were able to 
maintain or raise their average Net Tuition, while many law schools with stronger 
Reputations found themselves forced to reduce average Net Tuition more aggres-
sively. Because discounts at any specific law school, and more generally across 
all law schools, tend to flow to stronger students, the students with the least prom-
ising prospects for obtaining or making any economically sustainable use of their 
law degrees are paying the highest prices to obtain them. These inequalities ex-
panded significantly after 2010. 
Fourth and finally, because both Tuition Revenue and Profile decreased at 
many law schools, the distance between student needs and school resources has 
widened—millions of dollars in forgone Tuition Revenue are unavailable to meet 
the needs of students who at many law schools are significantly less prepared and 
qualified than their predecessors. The decreases in Bar Examination performance 
nationwide from 2014 to 2016 are a likely consequence of this growing incongrui-
ty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many casual observers of the American legal academy are aware of the 
substantial falloff in both the number and the conventional qualifications of ap-
plicants to law school that began after 2010. But few appreciate how wide-
spread and serious its effects have been, and there have been no studies, or at 
least no public studies, reporting either the overall nature and extent of those 
19 NEV. L.J. 583, BURK ET AL. 4/25/2019  8:25 PM 
586 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:2 
effects or how law schools have coped with the shock. This Article tries to fill 
that gap, analyzing the legal academy as a competitive market for legal educa-
tion, with law schools as sellers and prospective law students as buyers. 
Part I examines and quantifies the shock to the market for legal education 
that began after 2010, and its effects on accredited law schools. From academic 
years 2010–11 through 2016–17 (the “Comparison Period”), the number of 
unique applicants to accredited law schools fell 36 percent, and the number of 
applications fell a little less than 44 percent.1 In addition, the conventional met-
rics by which most admissions decisions are made—Law School Admissions 
Test (“LSAT”) scores and undergraduate grade-point average (“UGPA”)—
declined even more, as more highly credentialed applicants disproportionately 
stayed away. For example, while the number of applicants overall fell 36 per-
cent, the number of applicants with LSAT scores greater than 160 (roughly the 
80th percentile of all test-takers) fell 46 percent, while those with scores under 
150 (roughly the 44th percentile) fell only 27 percent.2 
The effects on the academy have been profound. By 2016–17, the average 
American law school had an entering class that was nearly one-third smaller 
and had a median LSAT score seven percentiles lower than in 2010–11. And 
while Base Tuition (a school’s published “sticker price”) had risen 15 percent, 
the average tuition discount had doubled, causing the average tuition paid per 
student net of discounts (“Net Tuition”) to fall over 6 percent in constant dol-
lars over the Comparison Period.3 
Nor were these effects distributed evenly across the academy. Instead, sec-
tors of the academy distinguished by their relative overall reputation for quality 
(“Reputation”) were affected quite differently. Among the private law schools 
that were part of this study, those in the top third Reputationally (the “Reputa-
tionally Stronger” schools) saw average entering-class Size decline by only 13 
percent while their average median LSAT percentile fell three points. By con-
trast, among the bottom two-thirds of law schools Reputationally, average en-
tering-class Size shrank by over a third and nearly a half, respectively, while 
average median LSAT fell 15 and 14 percentiles, respectively. Effects on the 
gross amounts of tuition collected (“Tuition Revenue”) were also pronounced. 
Reputationally Stronger law schools lost an average of $5.9 million per school 
in annual Tuition Revenue, while the bottom two-thirds of law schools Reputa-
tionally lost on average $11.6 million and $12.2 million annually per school, 
respectively in constant 2018 dollars.4 We estimate that aggregate annual Tui-
                                                        
1  See infra Figure 1.1, Appendix II. 
2  See infra Figure 1.2. 
3  See infra Section I.B. 
4  See infra Section I.B, Table 1.1. These effects describe the 110 accredited private law 
schools in the sample that is the basis for this study which, based on the statistical testing we 
have been able to do with the data available, appears representative of all accredited law 
schools during the Comparison Period. See infra Section II.C, Appendix II. 
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tion Revenue for all accredited American law schools fell over $1.5 billion in 
current dollars between its inflation-adjusted peak in 2011–12 and 2016–17.5 
In Part II, we discuss our data and methods, including how we define and 
measure the three “Performance Variables” that describe an individual law 
school’s relative performance as a seller in the market for legal education over 
the Comparison Period. Those variables are the change in the entering-class’s 
LSAT scores and UGPA over the six-year period (“ΔProfile”); the change in 
the size of the entering class (“ΔSize”); and the change in the average discount-
ed tuition (after accounting for scholarships) paid per student (“ΔNet Tui-
tion”).6 
These three variables reflect three ways that law schools coped with the 
sudden and drastic fall in demand to which they were subjected.7 Faced with 
fewer and less qualified prospective students, law schools had to make hard 
choices among the Performance Variables in selecting each new class of first-
year students. A law school could try to preserve entering-class Profile by sac-
rificing Size (taking fewer students, which makes it easier to maintain or mini-
mize decrease in Profile) and/or by sacrificing Net Tuition (trying to get 
stronger students by selectively offering them lower tuition); or it could pre-
serve entering-class Size by sacrificing Profile (taking a larger class of weaker 
students) and/or Net Tuition (effectively obtaining more buyers by lowering 
price); or it might try to hold Net Tuition higher by sacrificing Size (recogniz-
ing that fewer students are likely to pay the higher price) and/or Profile (recog-
nizing that stronger students will likely get better tuition deals elsewhere). Giv-
en that Size and Net Tuition combine to generate Tuition Revenue, to some 
extent these decisions balance Profile against Revenue. 
We then measure correlations between each Performance Variable and law 
schools’ Reputations. Part III discusses what we expected to find, and what was 
actually there.8 We expected that each Performance Variable would be corre-
lated with Reputation. In other words, we expected to see that the weaker a law 
school’s relative Reputation for quality, the more difficulty it would have at-
tracting students with the credentials it sought, so that as Reputation decreased, 
                                                        
5  See infra Section I.B. This effect is extrapolated from our sample to all accredited law 
schools. See supra Section II.C, Appendix II. 
6  The Greek letter Δ (delta) is used in its traditional sense of referring to change. Delta, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). 
7  One variable we do not address is each school’s access to operating funds other than tui-
tion, such as central university support, “rainy-day” funds, endowment, fundraising, and tui-
tion from non-JD programs. Obviously, alternative sources of funding affect the conditions 
and incentives for discounting tuition, but available data allow us to estimate only law 
schools’ degree of tuition discounting. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
8  Because available data made estimating average Net Tuition at public law schools impos-
sible, we worked with a sample of 110 private law schools, which we tested as best we could 
with available data to ensure it was representative of the entire population of accredited 
schools as a whole. See infra Section II.C, Appendix II. 
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Profile, Size and Net Tuition would also decrease.9 This hypothesis proved 
generally true, but with some (at least to us) surprising and enlightening excep-
tions. 
When we explored the relation between Performance Variable changes and 
Reputational strength, change in entering-class Size over the Comparison Peri-
od was, as expected, correlated with Reputation over the whole population test-
ed. But when we divided our sample into three subgroups by relative Reputa-
tion and tested the correlation within each subgroup, the three subgroups 
performed differently. In the top and bottom thirds Reputationally, change in 
Size was correlated with Reputation, but in the middle third it was not. We as-
cribe this anomaly to a phenomenon we call “Tradeoff Variability”: Schools in 
the middle third Reputationally (“Reputationally Middle”) were under substan-
tial pressure to adjust to the sudden fall in demand, and at a competitive disad-
vantage relative to Reputationally Stronger schools. In adjusting, each law 
school chose to compromise on the three different Performance Variables in its 
own way, depending on its circumstances. In varying degrees, some chose to 
give up more on Size; others more on Profile; yet others more on Net Tuition. 
Because each law school “chose its poison”—or rather its mix of poisons—in 
different proportions, competitive pressures were spread across the Perfor-
mance Variables sufficiently unequally from school to school that none of the 
Performance Variables was meaningfully correlated with Reputation in this 
subgroup.10 
When we examined the relationship between Reputation and change over 
the Comparison Period in entering-class Profile, we again saw, as expected, 
that change in Profile was correlated with Reputation over the whole popula-
tion tested. But when we isolated subgroups by relative Reputation and tested 
each separately, the correlation was statistically significant only in the Reputa-
tionally Stronger set of schools. For the reasons just discussed, we believe 
Tradeoff Variability explains the lack of correlation among Reputationally 
Middle schools. As for the bottom third Reputationally (“Reputationally Weak-
er” schools), it appears Regulatory Constraints affected performance. The Rep-
utationally Weaker law schools were willing to sacrifice Profile but were una-
ble to reduce their already-low entering-class Profile by as much as they 
otherwise might have because accreditation standards require schools to accept 
only students who appear able to graduate and pass a bar exam.11 
Finally, when we looked at the relationship between Reputation and 
change in average scholarship-discounted Net Tuition per student over the 
Comparison Period, surprisingly there was no statistically significant correla-
tion over the whole population. The reason becomes clearer when we look at 
the Reputational subgroups: Reputationally Stronger schools did see a correla-
                                                        
9  See infra Section III.A. 
10  See infra Section III.B.1, Table 3.2. 
11  See infra Section III.B.2, Table 3.3. 
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tion between Reputation and Net Tuition, which shows that among Reputation-
ally stronger law schools, the stronger the Reputation, the easier it is for the 
school to hold its price (Net Tuition) and still keep getting the number and 
quality of students it prefers. Reputationally Middle schools did not see any 
meaningful correlation, again because of Tradeoff Variability. But among Rep-
utationally Weaker schools, to our surprise Reputation was negatively correlat-
ed to a statistically significant degree with Net Tuition. In other words, some of 
the Reputationally Weaker schools were able to give up less in tuition discounts 
than some schools with stronger Reputations, and in some cases were actually 
able to raise their average Net Tuition and Tuition Revenue over the course of 
the Comparison Period. 
On its face, this seems quite odd; typically a product widely believed to be 
of inferior quality commands an inferior price. We believe this anomaly is ex-
plained by what we call the Limited Options Effect: That is, the weakest stu-
dents who are admitted to the Reputationally Weaker law schools have few op-
tions from which to choose. Those Reputationally Weaker law schools willing 
to admit the weakest students decline to negotiate tuition discounts with them 
because they don’t have to—these students have no or very limited alternatives 
if they wish to go to law school. In addition, this result may reflect a different 
weighting of the risks and potential rewards of being a weaker student at a 
weaker law school among the socioeconomically disadvantaged applicants who 
are disproportionately represented in this cohort as compared with applicants 
with broader options. As a result, some of these law schools can concede, on 
average, less in tuition than law schools that are better regarded, and in that 
sense, more in demand.12 
Similar factors lead to similar results when we examine the relationship be-
tween Reputation and change in total Tuition Revenue per school. The correla-
tions between Reputation and Tuition Revenue also reveal that Reputationally 
Stronger schools tend to preserve Profile over Size or Net Tuition, and in fact 
effectively forgo millions of dollars annually in Tuition Revenue to do so.13 
These findings point to several important observations with implications 
for the current state and probable future of the legal academy, which we discuss 
in Part IV. Four strike us as particularly salient: 
First, the Reputationally Stronger law schools chose to preserve entering-
class Profile at the expense of Size (and Net Tuition). In other words, they pur-
sued students with credentials at or near the levels they maintained before the 
shock and were willing to accept smaller entering classes (and more highly dis-
counted tuition) to get them. In the aggregate, this left thousands of viable can-
didates for less prestigious law schools. The difference amounts to about sixty 
students per class in Reputationally bottom-half institutions, or the aggregate 
entering class of about twenty such law schools. In short, elite and highly re-
                                                        
12  See infra Section III.B.3, Table 3.4. 
13  See infra Section III.B.4, Table 3.5. 
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garded law schools’ drive to keep their Profiles up effectively prevented the 
closing of as many as twenty weaker law schools.14 
Second, by 2016, many law schools had sacrificed millions of dollars in 
Tuition Revenue per year to try to maintain their Profiles. As a practical matter, 
then, some of the best-regarded law schools in the country made a choice to 
“invest” in trying to maintain Profile rather than generating revenue that might 
have allowed them to expand their faculty, facilities, or access to clinical and 
experiential education. We express no view on whether this was a wise invest-
ment choice and concede the possibility that it might have been necessary to 
preserve the quality that these law schools already enjoyed given the prevailing 
competitive environment. But surely the issue is worth discussing.15 
Third, while Base Tuition increased 10 to 15 percent in constant dollars 
over the course of the Comparison Period, average Net Tuition per student ac-
tually decreased—at many schools by double digits. As a result, the range of 
prices students paid for a legal education increased significantly over the Com-
parison Period. And because almost all scholarships at almost all law schools 
are “merit-” (that is, predominantly Profile-) based, overwhelmingly the weak-
est students paid the highest Net Tuition. In short, generally those students with 
the least promising prospects for obtaining or making any economically sus-
tainable use of their law degrees are paying the highest prices to obtain them, 
and these inequalities grew considerably over the course of the Comparison Pe-
riod.16 
Fourth and finally, both Tuition Revenue and Profile decreased at many 
law schools during the Comparison Period, in some cases substantially. As a 
result, many law schools are welcoming the least-credentialed and least-
academically-prepared classes they have ever encountered, with more students 
than ever in need of new or supplemental teaching and learning resources. Yet 
those schools face those student needs with unprecedentedly depleted resources 
because of the Net-Tuition and entering-class-Size reductions they have made. 
Even more ironically, the weakest students, who typically pay the highest Net 
Tuition, are seeing their disproportionate financial contributions allocated to 
educational resources other than the ones that they typically need more than 
their classmates do. In short, the discrepancy between student needs and law 
school resources has widened considerably since 2010—on the order of $1.5 
billion per year less in Tuition Revenue to meet the needs of students that at 
many law schools are on average 15 LSAT percentiles less prepared and quali-
fied.17 And the needs of the students who pay the most in tuition are being at-
tended to least. We are already seeing decreases in bar-passage statistics na-
                                                        
14  See infra Section IV.A. 
15  See infra Section IV.B. 
16  See infra Section IV.C. 
17  We acknowledge that the LSAT is an imperfect measure of anything that matters, but it 
has been shown to be at least a somewhat useful indicator of whatever constellation of prep-
aration, drive, and innate abilities lead to success in law school. See infra note 35. 
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tionwide, to which these trends cannot be irrelevant. The needs and prospects 
of these underserved students deserve to be seriously considered.18 
I. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT: THE MARKET FOR LEGAL EDUCATION, AND 
THE 2010 MARKET SHOCK 
A. The US Market for Legal Education 
By appointment of the United States Department of Education, law-school 
programs in the United States terminating in the Juris Doctor (“JD”) degree are 
accredited and regulated by the American Bar Association Section of Legal 
Education and Admission to the Bar and its governing Council (the “ABA”).19 
                                                        
18  See infra Section IV.D. 
19  See 20 U.S.C. § 1099b (2012) (listing the requirements for recognition by the Department 
of Education); 34 C.F.R. § 602.1 (2018) (discussing the purpose of accrediting agencies); 34 
C.F.R. § 602.2 (2018) (discussing the Department of Education’s online published list of 
accredited agencies); Accreditation in the United States, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Jan. 28, 2019), 
https://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/accreditation_pg7.html#law [https://perma.cc/L3 
SW-ZD4K] (listing the American Bar Association as the only accredited agency for legal 
education in the United States). We will refer to these accrediting authorities for convenience 
as the “ABA,” though for accreditation purposes the Section of Legal Education and Admis-
sion to the Bar and its governing Council by law must be, and to all appearances are, “sepa-
rate and independent” from the American Bar Association itself. See 20 U.S.C. § 1099b(b); 
34 C.F.R. § 602.14(b) (2018). 
This study focuses exclusively on accredited JD programs. Accreditation is important be-
cause a JD degree from an accredited American law school will allow an aspiring lawyer to 
sit for the Bar Examination in any American State or the District of Columbia, and passing a 
Bar Examination is almost always a prerequisite for a license to practice law in the adminis-
tering jurisdiction. (A few states and the District of Columbia will allow an individual to ap-
ply for licensure based on bar-passage and licensure in a sister state; and states that rely on 
the Uniform Bar Examination (“UBE”)—currently about twenty-five—will typically allow 
applicants to rely on their UBE scores wherever the exam was taken, though the passing 
UBE score varies from state to state.) A few states allow individuals to take their bar exams 
if they have graduated from a non-ABA-accredited law school approved by the state or have 
qualified by other means (such as independent study of the law under the supervision of a 
licensed lawyer), but these alternative routes to licensure are relatively rare, and rarely suc-
cessful. See generally NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAMINERS & AM. BAR. ASS’N SECTION OF 
LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION 
REQUIREMENTS 2018 1–11 (Judith A. Gundersen & Claire J. Guback eds., 2018). 
Many law schools also offer non-JD postgraduate legal education programs, including LLM 
and JSD degrees subsequent to the JD, as well as a proliferating number of postgraduate 
non-JD programs, typically of a year’s (or two years’ part-time) duration, terminating in a 
degree often referred to as a Master’s Degree in Legal Science (MLS) or Juridical Science 
(MJS). The latter programs usually focus on legally-oriented functions in various arms of 
commerce that are not always performed by licensed lawyers. They are much smaller than 
the flagship JD programs, but have been growing in size and number as demand for the JD 
degree has fallen. See Derek T. Muller, One in Ten Law School Enrollees is Not a Part of a 
JD Program, EXCESS DEMOCRACY (Jan. 22, 2016), http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2016 
/1/one-in-ten-law-school-enrollees-is-not-a-part-of-a-jd-program [https://perma.cc/L29G-2Z 
7C]. Non-JD postgraduate programs are not accredited by the ABA, though the ABA retains 
authority to permit accredited institutions offering JDs to offer the non-JD programs along-
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During the time period this Article explores—academic years 2010–11 through 
2016–17, the reasons for which will become clear shortly and to which we refer 
as the “Comparison Period”—nearly 200 law schools in the United States of-
fered fully-accredited JD programs.20 
Because a JD from an ABA-accredited law school is required in the vast 
majority of states to sit for the bar exam, most people considering a career as a 
lawyer seek admission to an ABA-accredited law school. By far the two most 
influential criteria in admissions decisions are applicants’ scores on the Law 
School Admission Test (“LSAT”), and their undergraduate grade-point averag-
es (“UGPA”).21 Law schools vary considerably in their selectivity with respect 
to these criteria, to which we refer as student “Profile.”22 Higher levels of both 
                                                                                                                                
side. For a list maintained by the ABA of the dozens of non-JD programs conducted by ac-
credited law schools, see LL.M. and Post-J.D. Degrees by School, ABA, https://www.americ 
anbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/llm-degrees_post_j_d_non_j_d/programs_by_sc 
hool.html [https://perma.cc/7VYF-N4TJ] (last visited Feb. 14, 2019). Our study does not 
take any non-JD students into account. 
20  See infra Section II.B for discussion on the Comparison Period. See infra Section II.C for 
discussion on the number of accredited schools during the Comparison Period and the com-
position of the sample group we used in this study. 
21  See The LSAT, LAW SCH. ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, https://www.lsac.org/jd/lsat/about-the-lsa 
t [https://perma.cc/HF76-XN3N] (last visited Feb. 14, 2019); Derek T. Muller, Solving Law 
School Admissions; Or, How U.S. News Distorts Student Quality, EXCESS DEMOCRACY 
(Aug. 27, 2013), http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2013/8/solving-law-school-admissions-
or-how-us-news-distorts-student-quality [https://perma.cc/RB5K-Y359] [hereinafter Muller, 
Law School Admissions]. An increasing number of law schools today are accepting scores on 
the Graduate Record Exam (“GRE”) in lieu of LSAT scores, provided that the school can 
demonstrate to the ABA that the GRE predicts success at its law school as reliably as the 
LSAT. See ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS. 
2018–2019, 33 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]; Kathryn Rubino, 25 
Percent of Law Schools Say They Plan to Accept the GRE, ABOVE LAW (Sept. 18, 2017, 9:40 
AM), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/09/25-percent-of-law-schools-say-they-plan-to-accept-
the-gre/ [https://perma.cc/EA4T-T3SS]; Stephanie Francis Ward, After Withdrawal of Law 
School Admissions Test Rule Revision, Will Fewer Schools Accept the GRE?, ABA JOURNAL 
(Aug. 9, 2018, 6:10 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/following_withdrawl_of_ 
admissions_test_rule_revision_will_fewer_schools_acc [https://perma.cc/LL7Y-W538]. The 
ABA House of Delegates recently tabled a resolution to broaden the tests available to law 
schools to include in their admissions process if they wished, see Ward, supra, but ABA 
Standard 503 still requires “a valid and reliable admission test,” see ABA STANDARDS, su-
pra, at 33, and thus some psychometrically standardized test score is part of almost every 
application to almost every law school. During the Comparison Period, no law school ac-
cepted the GRE as an alternative to the LSAT—the first, the University of Arizona, did not 
even start to try until 2016. Paul Caron, Arizona Is First Law School to Admit Students Based 
on GRE Instead of LSAT, TAXPROF BLOG (Feb. 11, 2016), https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxpr 
of_blog/2016/02/arizona-is-first-law-school-to-admit-students-based-on-gre-instead-of-lsat.h 
tml [https://perma.cc/8RDU-HQ45]. Accordingly, our quantitative study uses LSAT scores 
(along with UGPA) exclusively to describe students’ conventional qualifications. 
22  For an explanation of the quantitative measure of a law-school’s overall student Profile 
developed and used in this study, see infra Section II.D.1. For data on selectivity, including 
numbers of applications, acceptances, and matriculants by school, see the ABA Required 
Disclosures webpage. Standard 509 Disclosure, ABA, http://www.abarequireddisclosures.or 
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are consistently associated with law schools that enjoy stronger Reputations for 
overall quality, in part because these criteria tend to select stronger students 
who are in greater demand among more lucrative and prestigious employers,23 
and in part because LSAT and UGPA together account for 22.5 percent of the 
law-school rankings published annually in U.S. News and World Report, which 
is (for better or worse) an influential and widely relied-upon measure of relative 
reputation for overall quality.24 
Most students also are selective in choosing the law schools to which they 
apply and matriculate. While individual preferences can vary, applicants gener-
ally decide to attend the law school with the best general Reputation for overall 
quality—balanced against the lowest cost of attendance and geographical fa-
miliarity and convenience—that their credentials can bring them. As a result, 
the scholarships and other cost discounts that a law school may be willing to 
offer become a significant factor in many students’ decisions.25 
Law schools are required to publish a Base Tuition or “sticker price,”26 but 
many applicants’ actual tuition is less than sticker price because of the scholar-
ships law schools offer. Law schools also are required to publish the number of 
students across the entire student body who have received grants or scholar-
ships, which can give prospective students some idea of their own chances for 
                                                                                                                                
g/Disclosure509.aspx [https://perma.cc/2RKR-VDA7] (last visited Feb. 14, 2019) (select the 
year and the First-Year Class Section from the “Compilation—All Schools” box on the low-
er right). 
23  See infra note 59 and accompanying text. 
24  See Robert Morse & Kenneth Hines, Methodology: 2019 Best Law School Rankings, U.S. 
NEWS (Mar. 19, 2018, 9:30 PM), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/ 
articles/law-schools-methodology [https://perma.cc/3ML4-Q4SB]. Despite their many short-
comings and deep unpopularity in the academy, the U.S. News rankings are quite explicitly 
relied upon by most prospective law students in setting their priorities and making their 
choices in law school applications and matriculation. See infra note 80; see also Muller, Law 
School Admissions, supra note 21. Thus, whether or not they accurately reflect some meas-
urable underlying reality, see infra Section II.F, they are a good measure of law schools’ rel-
ative Reputation for overall quality. 
25  See Jerome M. Organ, Net Tuition Trends by LSAT Category from 2010 to 2014 with 
Thoughts on Variable Return on Investment, 67 J. LEGAL EDUC. 51, 74 (2017) (discussing 
the relative importance tuition discounts may have for students with different qualifications) 
[hereinafter Organ, Net Tuition]. See generally, GALLUP & ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHS., BEFORE 
THE JD: UNDERGRADUATE VIEWS ON LAW SCHOOL 54 fig.8.1 (2018) (noting that among over 
2700 first-year law students from over eighty law schools, location, reputation and financial 
support offered were three of the five most important criteria in selecting law school (along 
with employment outcomes and quality of faculty)); Christopher J. Ryan, Analyzing Law 
School Choice 20 tbl.4 (Working Paper No. 186, 2019) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.c 
fm?abstract_id=3309815 [https://perma.cc/BH3U-C8GN] (noting that among students at 
four different types of law schools, two of the most significant factors that influenced choice 
of law school were reputation and financial aid (along with job placement)). 
26  See infra note 44 and accompanying text. The term “sticker price” is in widespread use in 
law-school admissions circles, and reflects the strong analogies between Base Tuition and 
automobile sticker price—namely that both are published nominal prices from which many 
prospective purchasers negotiate downward. 
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scholarship aid.27 At the vast majority of law schools, scholarships are based on 
“merit” rather than student need, with schools competing for the “best” students 
as measured principally by LSAT and UGPA.28 
In short, these facts describe a market in which law schools are sellers, and 
law students are buyers, of a specific service: legal education intended to even-
tuate in a JD degree. It is a somewhat unusual market: In general, sellers are 
indifferent to the characteristics of their buyers (other than ability to pay), but 
law-school sellers care deeply about the characteristics of their prospective stu-
dent buyers. Law schools will negotiate price (that is, discount tuition) for ac-
cepted applicants with certain measurable characteristics, namely LSAT and 
UGPA credentials that are above the actual or aspirational median for that law 
school.29 Nonetheless, it also is an economic market in which buyers care deep-
ly about price and perceived value. The next section will describe a recent 
shock to this market—the significant decline in demand during the period fol-
lowing 2010—and will explore how that shock affected the market and its par-
ticipants. 
B. The Market Shock of 2010 
From the 1970s until 2008, with a brief dip in the early 2000s, the entry-
level job market for new law graduates grew steadily. The number of law-
school applicants and matriculants grew comparably, with some ebbs and 
flows.30 Figure 1.1 on the following page illustrates these trends. 
                                                        
27  See infra notes 44, 47, 65, and accompanying text. 
28  See Jerome Organ, How Scholarship Programs Impact Students and the Culture of Law 
School, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 173, 183 n.15 (2011) (noting that for the 160 law schools on 
which information was available only seven offered need-based scholarships) [hereinafter 
Organ, Scholarship Programs]; LSSSE Annual Results 2016: Types of Scholarship Awards 
(Part 1), LSSSE (Apr. 10, 2017), http://lssse.indiana.edu/blog/lssse-annual-results-2016-type 
s-of-scholarship-awards-part-1/ [https://perma.cc/P629-YMDU] (noting that 79 percent of 
scholarships awarded were merit-based that year). 
29  See Organ, Scholarship Programs, supra note 28, at 183–85 (discussing use of condition-
al scholarship programs to attract the highest possible entering class profile); Organ, Net Tui-
tion, supra note 25, at 55–64 (describing pricing pressures particularly on law schools with 
LSAT medians of 150–59, which saw net tuition decline over 10 percent between 2010 and 
2014); Muller, Law School Admissions, supra note 21 (describing admission process in 
which law schools refrain from admitting students whose LSAT and GPA indicators are just 
below the schools’ reported medians, opting to admit students with one indicator above the 
median even if the other indicator is further below the median). 
30  Figure 1.1 tracks “Law Jobs,” defined as full-time, long-term jobs requiring a law license 
and excluding solo practice and positions funded by the graduate’s law school. The reasons 
underlying this definition are presented in Bernard A. Burk, What’s New About the New 
Normal: The Evolving Market for New Lawyers in the 21st Century, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
541, 547–50, 555–63 (2014) [hereinafter Burk, New Normal]. The source for the Law Jobs 
information is the employment outcomes data self-reported by accredited law schools and 
gathered by the National Association for Law Placement (“NALP”) and the ABA since the 
1970s, selecting Law Jobs by the methodology described in Burk, New Normal, supra, at 
550. The source for the applicant and matriculant data is also data self-reported by accredited 
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FIGURE 1.1: NUMBER OF LAW JOBS, LAW-SCHOOL APPLICANTS, AND LAW-SCHOOL 
MATRICULANTS 2000–17 
As Figure 1.1 also illustrates, following the onset of the Great Recession in 
2008, entry-level legal hiring dropped precipitously.31 The number of appli-
                                                                                                                                
law schools and gathered by NALP and the ABA, as well as data gathered and reported by 
the Law School Admissions Council (“LSAC”). 
31  See Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big but Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the 
Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 27–39 (2011) 
[hereinafter Burk & McGowan, Big but Brittle]. The reasons for these reductions was only in 
part attributable to the cyclical effects of the Great Recession. Structural pressures on the 
way that complex legal services were staffed and priced that had begun to build years previ-
ously took hold as hard times forced more clients to rethink their legal costs. See Burk, New 
Normal, supra note 30, at 581–99. Though the Great Recession has been over for quite some 
time and unemployment generally is at historic lows, the number of Law Jobs is still down 
26 percent from 2007, and with the structural forces exerting downward pressure on the hir-
ing of new lawyers ever more firmly taking hold, there is no good reason to believe that the 
Law Job market will grow any faster than Gross Domestic Product for the foreseeable future. 
See Bernard A. Burk, The New Normal Ten Years In: The Job Market for New Lawyers To-
day and What It Means for the Legal Academy Tomorrow, 12 FLA. INT’L L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2019). 
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cants to law school increased in 2009 and 2010, resulting in the largest aggre-
gate entering class in American history in the fall of 2010 with roughly 52,500 
first-year students.32 By 2010, large firms’ layoffs of thousands of junior asso-
ciates and cutbacks in new hiring were front-page news and had become appar-
ent to college seniors and recent graduates considering law school.33 As a re-
sult, both law-school applications and entering-class Sizes began to drop 
steeply. Between 2010 and 2015, the number of unique applicants to law school 
per year fell 36 percent, and the total number of applications dropped 44 per-
cent.34 
Not only did the number of applicants to law school decrease, so did their 
conventional qualifications. Stronger students with higher test scores, who 
probably had the most varied and attractive alternatives to law school, dispro-
portionately stayed away compared to weaker applicants.35 Figure 1.2 illus-
trates these trends, focusing on applicants in three LSAT categories. 
                                                        
32  Am. Bar. Ass’n Section of Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, Enrollment and De-
grees Awarded 1963–2012, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrat 
ive/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YSA8-XSMD] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019). This small surge was typical of 
the response following all recessions from the 1970s on as graduating college seniors sought 
graduate and professional school as a shelter from an inhospitable employment market. See 
Burk, New Normal, supra note 30, at 565 figs. 2.1–2.2. 
33  See Burk & McGowan, Big but Brittle, supra note 31, at 28–36 and authorities cited. 
34  Applicants and applications dropped precipitously year-over-year in 2011, 2012, and 
2013 (-10.7%/-11.4%; -13.5%/-12.3%; -12.4%/-17.8%). See Appendix II. Both continued to 
fall less drastically in 2014 and 2015 (-6.3%/-8.0%; -2.2%/-4.2%). Id. By 2016, applicants 
and applications, as well as new matriculants, had finally levelled out—they actually rose 
slightly in 2016, although 2016 might have reflected a “false positive” as LSAC started re-
porting full-year applicant volume rather than fall applicant volume. Admission Trends: ABA 
Applicants, Admitted Applicants, and Applications, LSAC, https://www.lsac.org/lsacresource 
s/data/aba-eoy [https://perma.cc/2T5M-VRQR] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019). Applicants and 
applications were up by about 7.6 percent for fall 2018, id., a phenomenon that an LSAT 
test-preparation organization’s survey suggests was prompted by a sudden increase in gradu-
ating college students’ interest in involving themselves in the political events of the day ra-
ther than any sense that employment opportunities might be expanding (and that any addi-
tional law students therefore might be able to achieve their ambitions for full-time political 
engagement in the law when they graduate). See Jodi Teti, Are More Students Going to Law 
School as a Reaction to Trump?, LSAT BLOG (Aug. 29, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://blueprintlsat. 
com/lsatblog/law-school-2/students-going-law-school-reaction-trump/ [https://perma.cc/KV 
Z6-28LA]. 
35  We will throughout this Article refer generally to “stronger” or “weaker” applicants and 
students. This is a shorthand intended only for convenience to refer to students with higher 
(or lower) LSAT scores and UGPAs. We use this shorthand both because it corresponds to 
the measurable data we have, and because during this period most law-school admissions 
committees relied heavily on these data to the near-exclusion of almost anything else. We in 
no way intend to imply that LSAT and UGPA are all that is needed to predict whether an 
applicant is capable of completing a JD at any particular institution or of passing any state’s 
Bar Examination, let alone functioning as a practicing lawyer in any particular realm of prac-
tice. We believe that the ability to succeed in law school, or bar testing, or the legal profes-
sion calls upon a range of attributes, such as academic preparation in writing, numeracy and 
critical reasoning; acculturation; work ethic (sometimes thought of as drive or “grit”); and 
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FIGURE 1.2: HIGHEST LSAT SCORE CATEGORIES OF ABA APPLICANTS (COUNT) 2010–
2011 THROUGH 2017–1836 
By the time the size of the applicant pool had leveled out, the landscape 
had changed profoundly. As shown in the data presented in Appendix I, by the 
2016–17 academic year, the average private American law school (based on the 
110 law schools in our sample and weighted for class size) had: 
• A median entering-class LSAT of 156, down from 158 in 2010, a drop 
equivalent to 7 percentiles of the tested population;37 
                                                                                                                                
emotional and general innate intelligence, all in combination and in balance. See, e.g., Mar-
jorie M. Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness: Broadening the Basis 
for Law School Admission Decisions, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 620, 630 (2011) (identifying 
twenty-six effectiveness factors that are indicative of successful lawyers); Phase One: Sur-
vey & Results, IAALS, http://iaals.du.edu/projects/foundations-practice/phase-one-survey-re 
sults [https://perma.cc/J6CY-ZBS3] (last visited Feb. 17, 2019) (highlighting characteristics, 
competencies and skills identified by lawyers as being essential for recent law school gradu-
ates to be successful). LSAT and UGPA appear to reflect at least a few of these things, at 
least to some degree, but are primarily predictive of success in the first year of law school. 
See, e.g., LISA C. ANTHONY ET AL., PREDICTIVE VALIDITY OF THE LSAT: A NATIONAL 
SUMMARY OF THE 2013 AND 2014 LSAT CORRELATION STUDIES 1 (2016). 
36  Paul Caron, Updated LSAC Data on the Quantity and Quality of Law School Applicants, 
TAXPROF BLOG (Feb. 26, 2018), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2018/02/updated-ls 
ac-data-on-the-quantity-and-quality-of-law-school-applicants.html [https://perma.cc/8ALY-
T678]. 
37  See infra Appendix I. As discussed infra note 60 and accompanying text, the LSAT’s 
point-scoring scale does not translate to performance relative to other test-takers in linear 
terms. In other words, the normalized scale corresponds to different proportions of the tested 
population at different points on the scale. The one-point difference between 170 and 171 (or 
130 and 131) on the LSAT’s 120-to-180 normalized point scale amounts to less than one 
percentile; the difference between 150 and 151 amounts to nearly four percentiles. This ex-
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• An entering-class Size that was nearly one-third (31 percent) smaller than 
in 2010, reduced by an average of ninety-two students per entering 
class per school; 
• Average actual tuition paid per student (“Net Tuition”) that was 6.4 per-
cent less than it had been in 2010 (down from $35,251 in 2010 to 
$32,985 in 2016, measured in constant 2018 dollars). While weighted 
average Base Tuition “sticker price” rose 15 percent during the same 
period (from $42,434 in 2010 to $49,007 in 2016, measured in 2018 
dollars), the average scholarship discount per student had doubled (ris-
ing from 16.9 percent of Base Tuition in 2010 to 32.7 percent in 2016, 
again in real 2018 dollars), and the number of students receiving schol-
arships had also increased by more than 10 percent. 
As a result, from its inflation-adjusted peak in 2011–12 until 2016–17, 
overall average Tuition Revenue fell over one-third (-35 percent). In constant 
2018 dollars, we estimate that annual Tuition Revenue for all accredited law 
schools in 2016–17 was over $1.5 billion less than it had been in 2011–12—an 
average decrease of over $9 million in annual Tuition Revenue per law 
school.38 
Needless to say, these hardships were not distributed evenly across all law 
schools. 
                                                                                                                                
plains the widely varying percentile differences for what might appear to be similar scaled-
point differences here and infra Table 1.1. 
38  As shown infra Appendix I, Tuition Revenue in constant dollars peaked in 2011–12 
(without inflation adjustment, it was slightly higher in 2012–13). Both discounting and class 
contractions started somewhat gradually while Base Tuition generally continued to rise 
about 4 percent per year in nominal dollars (a common figure across higher education). All 
these figures are based on the sample used in this study of 110 accredited schools, described 
infra Section II.C. For the reasons discussed there, we believe this sample is representative 
of all accredited schools despite important gaps in our pricing data for the remaining eighty 
or so schools. The Tuition Revenue-loss estimate for all accredited law schools offered in the 
text is extrapolated from our sample group. 
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TABLE 1.1: PERFORMANCE CHANGES OVER THE COMPARISON PERIOD IN 
REPUTATIONALLY STRONGER VS. WEAKER PRIVATE LAW SCHOOLS39 
Metric Reputation 
Group40 
2010−1141 2016−17 Change 
Median 1L 
LSAT 
Stronger 166 164 -2 points = -3 percentiles 
Middle  156 152 -4 points = -15 percentiles 
Weaker 151 147 -4 points = -14 percentiles 
1L Class 
Size 
Stronger 11,133 9,689 -13% = -39 students/ 
entering class 
Middle  10,523 6,865 -35% = -102 students/ 
entering class 
Weaker 10,885 5,833 -46% = -136 students/ 
entering class 
Base  
Tuition 
Stronger 49,225 56,595 +15% 
Middle  41,400 45,492 +10% 
Weaker 35,580 39,817 +12% 
Avg. Net 
Tuition° 
Stronger 39,787 37,772 -5% 
Middle  34,252 28,914 -16% 
Weaker 30,974 29,231 -6% 
Avg.  
Discount° 
Stronger 9,438 18,823 +99% 
Middle  7,148 16,577 +132% 
Weaker 4,606 10,585 +130% 
Tuition 
Revenue 
(millions)° 
Stronger 1,349 1,129 -16% = -$5.9 million/school 
Middle  970 554 -43% = -$11.6 million/school 
Weaker 958 507 -47% = -$12.2 million/school 
As Table 1.1 shows, the Reputationally Stronger law schools generally suf-
fered least, while on many metrics Reputationally Middle law schools suffered 
most (though the Reputationally Weaker law schools often suffered almost as 
badly, or worse). For example, over the course of the Comparison Period, Rep-
utationally Middle and Weaker law schools lost on average twice as many 
LSAT points, and about five times as many LSAT percentiles, as the Reputa-
tionally Stronger ones. Reputationally Middle law schools shrank their enter-
ing-class Size on average more than twice as much as Reputationally Stronger 
ones, while Reputationally Weaker law schools shrank theirs on average more 
than three times as much. Financially, while almost all law schools consistently 
raised their Base Tuition in excess of inflation year after year, average Net Tui-
tion paid per student actually fell 5 to 6 percent in real dollars over the Compar-
ison Period at both the Stronger and Weaker schools Reputationally, with a 
much greater average decrease of 16 percent among Reputationally Middle law 
                                                        
39  The data from which these findings are derived and set out infra Appendix I. 
40  The third of the sample with the highest (Stronger), Middle, or lowest (Weaker) Reputa-
tion Score. See infra Section II.E. 
41  Tuition Revenue is for the 2011–12 academic year because that is the year Tuition Reve-
nue peaked. See supra note 38. 
  Dollar figures in constant 2018 dollars. 
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schools.42 And while Base Tuition rose, even the Reputationally Stronger law 
schools on average doubled their average tuition discounts over the course of 
the Comparison Period, while Reputationally Middle and Weaker law schools 
increased their discounting on average by even more—about 130 percent. As a 
result, Tuition-Revenue losses per school between 2011 and 2016 were twice as 
great for the Reputationally Middle and Weaker law schools (-$11.6 and -$12.2 
million per year per school, respectively, measured in constant 2018 dollars) 
than they were for the Reputationally Stronger (-$5.9 million per year per 
school, measured in constant 2018 dollars). All in six short years.43 
It would be no exaggeration to call these changes sudden, enormous, and 
drastic. 
These rapid and dramatic changes in demand, their substantial practical 
and economic effects on law schools, and their varying effects across the acad-
                                                        
42  As discussed in more detail below, the most surprising result to emerge from our exami-
nation of the legal academy in Reputational sectors is that, during a time when the number of 
applicants to law school fell dramatically, a number of the least-well-reputed law schools in 
the country managed to discount only modestly, maintain, or even raise the average Net Tui-
tion their students actually paid, while many better-regarded law schools were forced to dis-
count tuition substantially. See supra Table 1.1; infra Section III.B.3. 
43  Notably, the downturn has affected the number of law schools that remain in operation, 
even though some of the closures occurred after 2016. The Hamline University School of 
Law merged with the William Mitchell College of Law in 2015 to form Mitchell Hamline 
School of Law. See Josh Verges, William Mitchell, Hamline Law School Merger OK’d, 
TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS (Dec. 17, 2015, 5:13 PM), https://www.twincities.com/2015/12/ 
08/william-mitchell-hamline-law-school-merger-okd/ [https://perma.cc/K3R7-SLPJ]. We 
thus excluded both from our sample given that we did not have data to analyze through 2016 
for each law school. In addition, although the Charlotte School of Law did not announce its 
closure until August 2017, because grant and scholarship data is reported on a one-year de-
lay, we didn’t have grant and scholarship information for Charlotte for 2016 (it did not report 
such data in December 2017 since it had closed) and therefore excluded Charlotte from our 
sample as well. See Elizabeth Olson, For-Profit Charlotte School of Law Closes, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/business/dealbook/for-profit-charlott 
e-school-of-law-closes.html [https://perma.cc/3G4T-CNYR]. But more recently, three other 
law schools that were part of the Reputationally Weaker set of law schools within our sam-
ple are now closed or closing, including Whittier (April 2017), see Elizabeth Olson, Whittier 
Law School Says It Will Shut Down, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/04/19/business/dealbook/whittier-law-school-to-close.html [https://perma.cc/SGN7-Y4 
NU]; Valparaiso (October 2018), see Emma Whitford, Another Law School Will Close, 
INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/10/31/valpar 
aiso-law-school-will-close-following-unsuccessful-attempt-transfer-middle [https://perma.cc 
/W9V6-ZPQ3]; and Arizona Summit (October 2018), see Anne Ryman, Arizona Summit 
Law School Details Plans to Eventually Close Its Doors, AZCENTRAL (Oct. 25, 2018, 4:04 
PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-education/2018/10/25/arizona-su 
mmit-law-school-details-plans-close-its-doors/1763964002/ [https://perma.cc/W3YH-2KV5 
]. In addition, one school, Indiana Tech, that was not in our database because it never re-
ceived full accreditation, also announced in October 2016 that it was closing. See Fatima 
Hussein, Indiana Tech Will Shut Down Law School, INDYSTAR (Nov. 1, 2016, 12:32 PM), htt 
ps://www.indystar.com/story/news/education/2016/10/31/indiana-tech-shut-down-law-schoo 
l/93063296/ [https://perma.cc/4NGE-748Q]. 
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emy together raise the question whether we can identify groups of law schools 
whose characteristics predict the nature or extent of their reaction to the market 
shock. As we will see, the answer is that we can, and that some of those trends 
turn out to be surprising. The next Part discusses the data and methods we used 
to discern those trends. 
II. DATA AND METHODS 
A. The American Bar Association’s Disclosure Requirements for Accredited 
Law Schools 
Among the Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 
the ABA has promulgated (the “ABA Standards”) are a number requiring each 
accredited American law school to self-report annually to the ABA and to the 
public a range of information concerning its program, students, and educational 
outcomes, as well as students’ employment outcomes during the ten months af-
ter their graduation.44 
Law schools have been required since before 2010 to disclose annually 
their numbers of applicants, numbers of matriculants, and matriculants’ medi-
an, 25th-, and 75th-percentile LSAT scores and UGPA for each entering class, 
both full-time and part-time.45 While Base Tuition is reported in the current 
                                                        
44  ABA Standard 509(b) currently requires each accredited law school to 
publicly disclose on its website . . : (1) admissions data; (2) tuition and fees, living costs, and fi-
nancial aid; (3) conditional scholarships; (4) enrollment data, including academic, transfer, and 
other attrition; (5) numbers of full-time and part-time faculty, professional librarians, and admin-
istrators; (6) class sizes for first-year and upper-class courses; number of seminar, clinical and 
co-curricular offerings; (7) employment outcomes; and (8) bar passage data. 
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 21, at 35–36. The scope and detail of demographic, operation-
al, and employment-outcome information that the ABA has required law schools to disclose 
has evolved over time, and has expanded considerably since 2009, especially as to condi-
tional scholarships (that is, scholarships whose continuation after the first year is conditioned 
on something in addition to academic good standing) and employment outcomes. For discus-
sion of use and reporting of conditional scholarships, see generally Jerome M. Organ, Better 
Understanding the Scope of Conditional Scholarship Programs Among American Law 
Schools (Sep. 27, 2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2288915 [https://perma.cc/ELJ2-CAVZ]. 
For a history of law-school disclosure requirements regarding employment outcomes, see 
Burk, New Normal, supra note 30, at 550–53. For more specific details about what data dis-
closures are currently required, see Questionnaires & Applications, ABA, https://www.ameri 
canbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/questionnaire.html [https://perma.cc/YWE4-D 
U72] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) [hereinafter 2017–18 ABA Questionnaire]. The actual data 
disclosed as required by Standard 509, by school, for each year beginning 2010–11 may be 
found at Standard 509 Disclosure, supra note 22. 
45  ABA STANDARDS, supra note 21, at 35–36 (referencing admissions data and enrollment 
data). Our 2010 application and admissions data were obtained from the hardcopy 2012 
ABA-LSAC Official Guide (which was published in the summer of 2011 based on infor-
mation reported in the Annual Questionnaire from the fall of 2010). See generally LAW SCH. 
ADMISSIONS COUNCIL & AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE 
BAR, ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS, 2012 EDITION (2012) 
[hereinafter 2012 ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE]. Our 2011−2016 data was obtained from the 
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year, law schools report grants and scholarships one-year delayed, and are re-
quired to report grant and scholarship data only across all enrolled students, not 
class-by-class (though grant and scholarship disclosures do distinguish between 
full-time and part-time students as separate groups).46 
We have been forced to estimate the amounts of discounting from Base Tu-
ition by grants and scholarships at each law school because law schools are re-
quired to report grants and scholarships only in intervals. Specifically (and sep-
arately for full-time and part-time students as groups), the ABA since 2011 
requires disclosure of only the total number of students receiving a grant or 
scholarship in any amount, the number of students receiving less than 50 per-
cent of Base Tuition, the number receiving between 50 percent and 100 percent 
of Base Tuition, and the number of students receiving 100 percent or more of 
Base Tuition; as well as the 25th-, 50th-, and 75th-percentile grant amounts.47 
Accordingly, we calculate each school’s estimated average “Net Tuition” (that 
is, its average grant-adjusted tuition) per student each year based on the 
school’s entire student body.48 
                                                                                                                                
information on the ABA’s Standard 509 Required Disclosures website. Standard 509 Dis-
closure, supra note 22. 
46  See 2017–18 ABA Questionnaire, supra note 44 (found in Part I, Part IV questionnaires). 
All data of interest are disclosed separately for full-time and part-time students. As a result, 
we were able to carry out our analysis on full-time and part-time students combined. In most 
cases, the changes in Profile, Size and Net Tuition, see infra Section II.D, during the Com-
parison Period were broadly similar whether we used the combined data, or just data on full-
time students. We were particularly concerned about Net Tuition, because part-time tuition is 
typically less per year than full-time tuition, though part-time students often pay more in to-
tal for the degree because they must enroll for four rather than three years. A school that in-
creased its part-time enrollment relative to full-time over the course of the Comparison Peri-
od would appear to have reduced its average Net Tuition per student simply because part-
time students pay less per year, even though the law school had enrolled more students, and 
was realizing more Tuition Revenue. However, the correlations relied on in this study, see 
discussion infra Part III, did not materially change when we used only full-time students or 
when we equalized part-time Net Tuition to account for the fact that it is spread over four 
rather than three years. Thus, any material distortion resulting from lower annual part-time 
tuition does not appear to present itself in this dataset. Accordingly, we use the combined 
full-time and part-time data without normalizing the part-time data in any way because they 
are used both by the ABA for accreditation purposes and by publications such as U.S. News 
for ranking purposes, and also to avoid any possible opportunistic classification by a report-
ing school. 
47  See 2017–18 ABA Questionnaire, supra note 44 (found in Part IV questionnaire). Before 
2011, schools were required to disclose even less—only Base Tuition, median grant 
amounts, and the total number of students with and without grants. See infra note 66. 
48  See infra Section II.D.3 for the estimation formula we have used. As with our admissions 
and matriculation data, our 2010 tuition data were obtained from the hardcopy 2012 ABA-
LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE, supra note 45, and our 2011–16 tuition data were obtained from the 
Required Disclosure Information on the ABA’s Standard 509 Required Disclosures website, 
Standard 509 Disclosure, supra note 22. The grants and scholarship information were ob-
tained from the 2011 to 2017 Required Disclosure Information as they are reported on a one-
year delayed basis. Id. 
19 NEV. L.J. 583, BURK ET AL. 4/25/2019  8:25 PM 
Winter 2018] COMPETITIVE COPING STRATEGIES 603 
B. The Comparison Period 
Our Comparison Period begins with the 2010–11 academic year, which for 
most accredited American law schools represents an historical high-water mark 
for law-school admissions in terms of the Size and Profile of the entering class. 
That year also marks the beginning of the market shock in legal education re-
sulting from the collapse of the job market for new law graduates a couple of 
years earlier.49 
The Comparison Period ends with the 2016–17 academic year, by which 
time the market shock and its effects had for the most part stabilized, and 
schools generally had adjusted to a “new normal” in demand.50 
C. The Law Schools Comprising Our Dataset 
The law schools on whose data we rely in this study comprise 110 private 
law schools that were fully accredited continuously during the Comparison Pe-
riod.51 We very much would have liked to have included all law schools, both 
public and private, that were fully accredited throughout the Comparison Peri-
od. Unfortunately, public law schools charge different levels of Base Tuition to 
in-state and out-of-state residents, but are not required to (and typically do not) 
disclose how many students of each category attend the school in any given 
year.52 Moreover, we have no confidence that public law schools in different 
                                                        
49  See supra Sections I.A, I.B, and Figure 1.1; see also infra Appendix I. 
50  See supra Section I.A, Figure 1.1; see also infra Appendix I. We acknowledge that the 
number of law-school applicants increased by about 8 percent in 2018–19, with first-year 
enrollment increasing about 3 percent to roughly 38,400. See Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Le-
gal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, New Data Confirm Boost in Law School Attendance, ht 
tps://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2018/12/new-data-confirms-b 
oost-law-school/ [https://perma.cc/A6GF-DDX7] (last visited on Feb. 18, 2019); see also, 
Jerry Organ, Analyzing Enrollment and Profile Patterns Across Different Tiers of Law 
Schools for Fall 2018, TAXPROF BLOG (Jan. 2, 2019), https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_bl 
og/2019/01/analyzing-enrollment-and-profile-patterns-across-different-tiers-of-law-schools-f 
or-fall-2018.html [https://perma.cc/ZU6N-N3DK]. But the number of entry-level law jobs 
has remained flat, and shows no indication it will return to the levels prevailing ten or even 
twenty years ago for many years. See supra note 31 (expressing doubt whether the entry-
level employment market would be able to accommodate a larger graduating class). We con-
cur with the National Association for Law Placement in questioning the wisdom of admis-
sions policies that expand entering classes without regard to the availability of Law Jobs for 
the additional graduates that will result. See Karen Sloan, Job Market for Law Grads ‘Sur-
prisingly Strong,’ NALP Finds, LAW.COM (Aug. 1, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.law.com/20 
18/08/01/job-market-for-law-grads-surprisingly-strong-nalp-finds/ [https://perma.cc/N2BT-
G2KK]. 
51  The sample excludes programs that existed or were accredited for only part of the Com-
parison Period, or that merged with another law school during the Comparison Period mak-
ing continuous quantitative comparison impossible, see supra note 43, but includes law 
schools that changed name or ownership only. It also excludes three law schools located in 
Puerto Rico, as they serve a different market. 
52  This omission is further complicated by the fact that some states make it relatively easy 
for out-of-state students to qualify for in-state Base Tuition by their second year, while oth-
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states and with different Reputations for quality have similar proportions of in-
state and out-of-state students, or even that a given public law school would 
have the same proportion of in-state and out-of-state students over time.53 It 
therefore is impossible to determine average tuition per student (either at Base 
Tuition or grant-adjusted Net Tuition) reliably at a public law school. Because, 
as we will see, a law school’s decisions on Net Tuition are a critical factor in 
quantifying its market performance, and we were unable to reliably estimate 
average Net Tuition per student at public law schools, we regretfully and re-
grettably were forced to omit all public law schools from our analysis.54 
We do, however, have good reason to believe that our sample is representa-
tive. The sample size is quite substantial—110 law schools all over the country 
and including institutions across the entire range of Reputation for quality. As 
noted in Appendix II, matriculants at private law schools represent just less 
than two-thirds of the total at all accredited law schools, with this ratio remain-
ing relatively stable throughout the Comparison Period. The same is broadly 
true of the total number of JD students (all classes), and the total number of ap-
plications for law schools in our sample as compared with all accredited law 
schools.55 Moreover, the size and direction of the aggregate changes in enter-
ing-class Size and Profile for the law schools in our sample group during the 
Comparison Period are well correlated with those for all accredited law schools 
as a whole.56 Thus, while the data currently available do not allow us to prove 
that changes in actual average Net Tuition per student at our sample law 
schools are well correlated with such changes in all accredited law schools over 
the Comparison Period, the sample’s comparable performance over all other 
relevant variables suggests that they are. 
                                                                                                                                
ers make it quite difficult, so students can change residency status year-to-year in ways that 
are not generalizable across all public law schools. 
53  What little information is available publicly suggests that there is significant variability, 
with resident percentages ranging from as low as 20 percent to as high as 78 percent in a 
sample of five public law schools with published residency information. Michigan (20 per-
cent), Class Statistics, MICH. LAW, https://www.law.umich.edu/prospectivestudents/Pages/cl 
assstatistics.aspx [https://perma.cc/SQT2-5W55] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); UCLA (58 per-
cent), UCLA Law Incoming Class Profile, UCLA LAW, https://law.ucla.edu/admissions/class 
-profile/ [https://perma.cc/35TP-QDUL] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); Kansas (64 percent), 
2018 Entering Class Profile, KU SCH. LAW, https://law.ku.edu/profile [https://perma.cc/THG 
3-ZPET] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); Memphis (72 percent), Memphis Law Entering Class 
Profile: Class of 2021, UNIV. MEMPHIS, https://www.memphis.edu/law/documents/factsheet_ 
2018_19_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/RH8K-48G8] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); Florida (78 
percent), Entering Class Profile, LEVIN C. LAW, https://www.law.ufl.edu/admissions/apply/e 
ntering-class-profile [https://perma.cc/VM88-5WPW] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019). 
54  Our dataset also excludes Brigham Young University because, consistent with its reli-
gious mission, it offers different Base Tuition to Mormon and non-Mormon students, but 
does not reveal the proportion of students allocated each Base Tuition amount. Tuition, 
BYU, https://finserve.byu.edu/content/tuition-and-general-fees [https://perma.cc/ZWX7-R3 
YR] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019). 
55  See infra Appendix II. 
56  See infra Appendix II. 
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D. The Variables that Describe a Law School’s Performance as a Seller in the 
Market for Legal Education 
While, as we will show, overall general Reputation for quality is an im-
portant factor driving outcomes in the market for legal education, it does not 
directly describe an individual school’s performance in the market. We assume 
that, all else being equal, on a year-over-year basis, the typical law school 
would like to maintain (or increase) both its gross Tuition Revenue and its stu-
dent-qualification metrics (“Profile”). But with application numbers and aver-
age applicant Profiles falling after 2010, most law schools had to make hard 
decisions: Law schools could attempt to maintain Profile at the cost of entering-
class Size and/or average Net Tuition, thus sacrificing Revenue. Or they could 
attempt to maintain Revenue by maintaining class Size and average Net Tui-
tion, but enrolling weaker students and giving up Profile. Or they could do 
some combination of both, giving up some Revenue (by shrinking entering-
class Size and/or discounting average Net Tuition), and also giving up some on 
Profile, while trying to minimize erosion on both parameters as much as possi-
ble.57 
We thus isolated three “Performance Variables”: 
1. Profile 
A law school’s student Profile (that is, the aggregate credentials of its en-
tering class) is of great importance to applicants and law schools alike because 
both assume (largely correctly) that higher-Profile schools have better Reputa-
tions for overall quality, and tend to have both better bar passage rates and bet-
ter job prospects after graduation.58 As discussed above, LSAT and UGPA 
comprise 22.5 percent of a school’s U.S. News ranking—a widely used proxy 
for Reputation on which most prospective law students rely in choosing among 
the schools that have accepted them.59 It is not difficult to infer from these facts 
that law schools seek out applicants with strong credentials not only because 
they believe those credentials provide some predictive value for academic and 
                                                        
57  See infra Section III.A. 
58  See Organ, Net Tuition, supra note 25, at 58–59; Aaron N. Taylor, Diversity as a Law 
School Survival Strategy, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 321, 332–33 (2015); Bill Henderson, How the 
“Cravath System” Created the Bi-Modal Distribution, EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES (July 18, 
2008, 2:14 AM), https://www.elsblog.org/the_empirical_legal_studi/2008/07/how-the-cravat 
h.html [https://perma.cc/Z86P-E3BN]; see also Ilana Kowarski, Why Big Law Firms Care 
About Which Law School You Attend, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 1, 2018, 10:39 AM), https://www.usn 
ews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/articles/2018-08-01/why-big-law-
firms-care-about-which-law-school-you-attend [https://perma.cc/27WA-2EG2]. 
59  As discussed below, see infra notes 74, 80, and accompanying text, our reliance on U.S. 
News rankings reflects our understanding not that they are methodologically sound or accu-
rately reflect some underlying objective reality, but simply that they both reflect and rein-
force a widespread understanding of (that is, Reputation for) quality and desirability in the 
relevant market among actual buyers in that market-prospective law students. 
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bar exam performance as well as future practice success, but because they 
strengthen the law school’s Reputation and attract other stronger students in a 
virtuous cycle. 
We measured Profile by creating a normalized score combining LSAT and 
UGPA for each sample law school’s entering class in a given year. Specifically, 
we first converted each school’s median scores (on the 120-to-180-point scale 
on which LSAC reports them) to their percentile equivalent (“P-LSAT”), using 
data provided by LSAC and based on all test takers over rolling three-year pe-
riods.60 For UGPA, there are no equivalent percentile measures, so we simply 
normalized median percentile UGPA scores to a 100-point scale (“N-UGPA”). 
For purposes of comparing changes in Profile over the Comparison Period, we 
then combined these LSAT and UGPA scores into a single overall Profile score 
for each year that weighted P-LSAT 55 percent and N-UGPA 45 percent.61 
Thus we calculate each school’s Profile in each year as follows: 
Profile62 = 0.45(median N-UGPA) + 0.55(median P-LSAT) 
                                                        
60  The conversion of LSAT scores to a percentile of the tested population is intended to 
make the LSAT’s nonlinear scoring scale linear and expose the true relative magnitude of 
many of the changes that occurred. Cambridge LSAT reports conversions of LSAT-scaled 
scores to percentiles on a rolling three-year basis. LSAT Percentiles Table, CAMBRIDGE 
LSAT, https://www.cambridgelsat.com/resources/data/lsat-percentiles-table/ [https://perma.c 
c/F2XU-BDPZ] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019). The graph below shows the conversion in 2009–
12. Graphs for subsequent three-year windows are almost identical, although there was a 
very small decline in average test scores across all candidates between 2009–12 and 2012–
15. For example, a test taker scoring 156 during 2009–12 was in the 66.7th percentile, while 
the same score for 2012–15 was in the 67.0th percentile. Data on scaled-to-percentile con-
versions that include 2016 test takers are not yet publicly available. 
FIGURE 2.1: LSAT VS PERCENTILE: 2009–12 
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61  This weighting reflects the relative weight we believe that admissions officers place on 
these metrics because of the relative weight accorded these factors in the U.S. News rank-
ings. We also carried out all of our analysis using various alternative measures of Profile, 
trying weightings of 25th-, median, and 75th-percentile LSAT scores, Percentile-LSATs and 
UGPAs. None of these differences had any significant effect on our quantitative results, and 
thus do not affect the qualitative discussion. 
62  We used this formula separately on full-time and part-time enrolled students, and then 
calculated composite Profile as a weighted average of full time and part time Profiles (with 
the weights being the number of entering students in the full-time vs. part-time programs at 
each school). 
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The focus of this study is to quantify and compare the change in each of 
the Performance Variables over the course of the Comparison Period (2010–16) 
in response to the market shock of 2010. A particular law school’s percentage 
change in Profile over the Comparison Period (“ΔProfile”) is then simply: 
ΔProfile = (2016 Profile / 2010 Profile) - 1 
Where we discuss the status of or changes in the legal academy overall, 
each law school’s entering-class composite LSATs and UGPAs, respectively, 
are combined in a weighted average for each year. Using a weighted average 
more closely approximates the overall pool of matriculants because a linear av-
erage would give law schools with smaller enrollments the same weight as law 
schools with larger enrollments. In other words, without a weighted average, 
smaller schools’ students would each be accorded greater relative weight than 
larger law schools’ in the overall average. 
For example, the weighted average (“WA”) Median LSAT (“MedLSAT”) 
for all schools in our sample in a given year would be calculated as: 
WA MedLSAT = Σi (MedLSATi x Sizei) / Σi (Size), across all schools i 
Where Sizei = size of the matriculating class at school i
63 
2. Size 
Size is simply the total number of both full-time and part-time students in a 
school’s entering first-year class in a given year. As demand (as measured by 
the number of applicants) fell, it became more difficult for many law schools to 
maintain the entering-class Size to which they were accustomed with the level 
of Profile to which they were accustomed; there were no longer enough appli-
cants with each school’s customary LSAT and UGPA to go around. Many law 
schools were forced to consider trading off Size against Net Tuition and/or Pro-
file—that is, to accept students with weaker-than-customary Profile in order to 
maintain entering-class Size, or to “buy” students with stronger Profile by dis-
counting tuition; or to accept a smaller entering-class Size in order to hold off 
deterioration in Profile or Net Tuition. Thus changes in Size were one way that 
individual schools coped with the sudden reduction in demand.64 
We calculate percentage change in matriculating-class Size for each law 
school over the course of the Comparison Period (“ΔSize”) as: 
ΔSize = (2016 Size / 2010 Size) - 1 
                                                        
63  Accordingly, infra Appendix I includes weighted average LSAT scores and percentiles 
for each year in the Comparison Period. Table 1.1 uses weighted averages for the data it pre-
sents. See supra Table 1.1. 
64  Infra Appendix I contains aggregate entering-class Size for the academy as a whole, and 
for sectors divided by stronger, middle, or weaker Reputation for quality, during the Com-
parison Period. 
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3. Net Tuition 
Unlike applicant, matriculant, and Profile measures (which law schools are 
required to report for each matriculating class) law schools report tuition, 
scholarships, and grants only across all enrolled students each year. Thus our 
analysis of changes in Net Tuition is necessarily provided on a rolling basis 
covering the entire student body.65 
Schools report both Base Tuition and median grants and scholarships, as 
well as the total number of students receiving no scholarship aid, grants of less 
than 50 percent of tuition, grants of between 50 percent and 100 percent of tui-
tion, and receiving 100 percent or more (a few students at some schools receive 
assistance towards living expenses as well as a free ride on tuition).66 However, 
both the numbers of students receiving grants and the size of the grants them-
selves as a percentage of Base Tuition changed between 2010 and 2016,67 mak-
ing Base Tuition figures useless, if not misleading, as an approximation of the 
                                                        
65  Fortunately, our use of data from the entire student body at each school to estimate aver-
age actual Net Tuition paid per student each year may result in a more accurate estimate of 
average Net Tuition and related metrics than would Net Tuition data from the entering class 
alone. That is because these figures may change significantly for a particular student after 
the first year given the conditional scholarship programs implemented at a number of law 
schools during the Comparison Period. Using tuition and discount data for all students at-
tending a school each year also allows the average Net Tuition estimate to reflect the actual 
tuition paid by students transferring into the school after the first year (and eliminates the 
effect of any scholarship recipient who transferred out) as well as accounting for any chang-
es (up or down) in the amount of financial aid students may receive after the first year. 
66  In 2011, schools started reporting 25th- and 75th-percentile grant amounts in addition to 
the median. Because these breakdowns were not reported in 2010, we use only median 
grants to estimate average Net Tuition in both 2010 and 2016 to maintain consistency. As a 
check, we also separately estimated each school’s 2016 average Net Tuition based on 25th- 
and 75th-percentile grants, and compared them to the 2016 average Net Tuition estimated 
from median grants. The two series are very highly correlated (ρ = 96 percent), with an aver-
age difference of less than $2,000, suggesting that the true distribution of tuition grants likely 
is reasonably symmetric at most schools. 
Schools are also required to disclose an estimated cost of living while attending school. See 
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 21, at 35 (requiring these disclosures in Standard 509(b)(2)). 
Although cost of living obviously varies at different law schools in our sample, we elected 
not to include these cost-of-living figures in our comparisons of the estimated cost of attend-
ance. We did so for two reasons: First, the cost-of-living estimates the schools supply are 
unreliable. Schools in the same urban metropolitan area differ in their estimates in a manner 
that could skew the trends we are attempting to discern and describe. For example, cost of 
living among law schools in Philadelphia in 2016 ranged from roughly $22,500 to more than 
$25,500, and in New York, from roughly $20,000 to more than $27,000. See Standard 509 
Disclosure, supra note 22. In addition, many applicants limit their applications locally or 
regionally. GALLUP & ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHS., supra note 25, at 55 fig.8.2. (showing that 
location of the law school was the top factor in considering where to apply to law school 
across all first-year law students participating in the survey with LSATs less than 165). 
These self-imposed limitations often result in many students with more than one acceptance 
choosing among schools with comparable cost of living, making any differences less likely 
to influence buying choices. 
67  See supra Table 1.1, text accompanying notes 39–43. 
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actual Net Tuition students are paying. Indeed, candidates with offers of ac-
ceptance from multiple law schools often negotiate tuition discounts by putting 
law schools in competition with one other on the basis of grant amount.68 We 
therefore analyze changes in average Net Tuition—the estimated amount the 
average student actually paid—from 2010 to 2016. 
To estimate average Net Tuition per student for each law school in a given 
year, we multiply the law school’s median grant by the percentage of enrolled 
students receiving a grant, and subtract this from the Base Tuition (“BT”). 
Thus: 
Net Tuition69 = BT - MedG x %G where 
BT = Base Tuition; 
MedG = median grant ($); and 
%G = percentage of enrolled students who received grants 
Accordingly, we can estimate the percentage change in average Net Tui-
tion per student for a particular law school over the course of the Comparison 
Period (“ΔNet Tuition”) as: 
ΔNet Tuition = (2016 Net Tuition / 2010 Net Tuition) - 1 
We also calculate weighted average (“WA”) Net Tuition across all law 
schools in the sample in a given year, where the weights are the total numbers 
of enrolled students at each school: 
WA Net Tuition = Σi (Net Tuitioni x Censusi) / Σi (Census), across all law  
schools i, where 
Censusi = number of enrolled students at each law school i in the sam-
ple 
The calculation for weighted average Base Tuition across all law schools in 
a given year is, equivalently, 
WA BT = Σi (BTi x Censusi) / Σi (Census), across all law schools i, where 
Censusi = number of enrolled students at each law school i in the sam-
ple 
Appendix I shows that weighted average Net Tuition across the entire legal 
academy actually rose gradually early in the Comparison Period. This occurred 
because, even in an environment of falling demand, most law schools still in-
creased their Base Tuition each year by 4 percent in nominal dollars (with the 
                                                        
68  See, e.g., Christen Morgan, Ahead of the Curve: The Power of Negotiation: When Should 
I Negotiate My Law School Scholarship Offer?, LAW SCHOOL TOOLBOX (Mar. 31, 2017), htt 
ps://lawschooltoolbox.com/ahead-of-the-curve-the-power-of-negotiation-when-should-i-neg 
otiate-my-law-school-scholarship-offer/ [https://perma.cc/R6Y4-6MT2]. 
69  As with Profile, see supra note 62, we used this formula separately for full-time and part-
time students, and then calculated composite Net Tuition as a weighted average of full time 
and part time Net Tuition (with the weights being the number of enrolled students in the full-
time vs. part-time programs). As discussed supra note 46, we combined full-time and part-
time Net Tuition data without adjustment despite the fact that part-time tuition is generally a 
lower amount per year paid for four rather than three years, because no material distortion 
resulted from our doing so in this dataset. 
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exception of 2015, when the weighted average increase was 3 percent nominal-
ly).70 The average annual increase in the median grant, however, was much 
larger, and the number of students receiving grants increased as well.71 With 
considerable variation in discounting across law schools, many law schools 
were charging average Net Tuition lower than in prior years by early in the 
Comparison Period. By 2014, nominal weighted average Net Tuition began to 
go down overall (even before adjusting for inflation; in real terms the decline 
began in 2013), despite consistent yearly increases in Base Tuition.72 
E. Using Net Tuition to Estimate Tuition Revenue 
We also estimate law schools’ total Tuition Revenue each academic year 
by multiplying each law school’s estimated average Net Tuition per student by 
the total number of enrolled students. We then estimate the total Tuition Reve-
nue (“TR”) across all law schools as the sum of the individual law schools’ to-
tals: 
All Law Schools’ TR = Σi (Net Tuitioni x Censusi) where 
Censusi = number of enrolled students at each law school i in the sam-
ple 
As might be expected, year-on-year changes in Tuition Revenue follow a 
trajectory similar to changes in average Net Tuition, especially in years for 
which total enrollments remain somewhat stable. Declining enrollment and in-
creasing discounting generate the first nominal Tuition Revenue decline in 
2013–14, with the decline in real terms beginning in 2012–13. The most signif-
icant percentage drop in Tuition Revenue occurs in 2014–15, which is the first 
year in which weighted average Net Tuition across all law schools is lower than 
in the previous year.73 
 
                                                        
70  See infra Appendix I. 
71  See infra Appendix I. 
72  See infra Appendix I. 
73  See infra Appendix I. Tuition Revenue is, for most schools, the most significant source of 
operating income, but it is by no means the only one. Frank H. Wu, Where Law Schools Get 
Their Money, ABOVE LAW (Oct. 3, 2013, 3:56 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2013/10/where-
law-schools-get-their-money/ [https://perma.cc/3KMN-YVXR]. “Rainy Day” funds accumu-
lated during better times, subsidies from the greater University of which the law school is a 
part (or in the case of public institutions, from the state), fundraising, and endowment can all 
be sources of operating funds, and we imagine (and are anecdotally informed) that quite a 
few law schools depended on them more and more as the renewable resource of student tui-
tion became scarcer. See id. In addition, the number of law schools offering alternative de-
grees and the number of students enrolled in alternative degree programs has increased dur-
ing this period. Muller, supra note 19. The degree to which these sources are sustainable, or 
conversely the degree to which increasing reliance on some of them undermines the econom-
ic sustainability of many of these institutions, is a question of quite literally existential im-
portance. 
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F. The Use and Measurement of Relative Reputation for Overall Quality in 
this Study 
In describing law schools’ performance in the market for legal education, 
we must begin by stressing that we were not seeking to develop, nor do we of-
fer our model as, a ranking system. Existing law-school ranking systems tend 
to aggregate and weight different variables into an overall ordinal list designed 
to evaluate relative general overall quality or, more accurately, relative reputa-
tion for overall quality, in the sense that an interested observer would say in 
general terms that one school is “better” than another.74 We refer to this notion 
as “Reputation.” 
However, Reputation as just defined plays a critical role in this study: We 
have found that a law school’s relative Reputational strength has a very signifi-
cant effect on the school’s performance on various different metrics in the legal 
education market. We hypothesize, quantify, and demonstrate those relation-
ships below.75 But we pause here to examine the concept of Reputation and de-
scribe how we measure it for purposes of this study. 
Reputation is quite important in many contexts, in essence because it can 
often be used as a loose proxy for assessing the actual underlying attribute that 
                                                        
74  Ironically, the annual U.S. News rankings are published under the title “Best Law 
Schools,” though the publication ranks three-quarters of them ordinally (listing the remain-
der with the notation “Rank Not Published”), and includes virtually every accredited law 
school in the country. See Morse & Hines, supra note 24. Although it has varied over the 
years, U.S. News generally combines scores derived from each school’s entering-class medi-
an LSAT (and after the Comparison Period ended, GRE) scores (12.5 percent), median 
UGPA (10 percent), and Acceptance Rate (2.5 percent); a “Peer Assessment Score” based on 
a survey of legal academics (25 percent), a separate assessment score based on a survey of 
lawyers and judges (15 percent); a Placement Success score (20 percent, including employ-
ment at graduation (4 percent), employment at ten months (14 percent) and Bar Passage Rate 
score (2 percent)); and a Faculty Resources score that assesses expenditures per student 
(11.25 percent), the student-faculty ratio (3 percent), and Library Resources (0.75 percent). 
Id. Other rankings systems combine similar or additional variables in similar or different 
ways. See, e.g., Alfred L. Brophy, Ranking Law Schools with LSATs, Employment Out-
comes, and Law Review Citations, 91 IND. L.J. SUPPLEMENT 55, 56–57 (2015); Methodology, 
ABOVE LAW, https://abovethelaw.com/law-school-rankings/top-law-schools/#methodology 
[https://perma.cc/TTP2-P2JS] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019) (explaining the industry website 
Above the Law’s ranking system, which weights Employment (30 percent) “Quality Jobs” 
(30 percent); Education Cost (15 percent); Debt per Job (10 percent); the school’s graduates 
as a percentage of Supreme Court and other federal court judges (5 percent each); and an 
alumni survey (5 percent)). A recently proposed ranking system focuses solely on entering-
class LSAT and UGPA on the theory that the “best” students will predictably choose the 
“best” schools. Christopher J. Ryan, Jr. & Brian L. Frye, A Revealed-Preferences Ranking of 
Law Schools, 69 ALA. L. REV. 495, 498–99 (2017). As noted in this article, however, that 
apparent “choice” is colored both by the Size of the entering class at a given law school and 
by the Net Tuition the law school charges, which is why our analysis focuses on all three 
performance variables. See supra notes 57–72 and accompanying text. 
75  See infra Part III. 
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is the subject of the reputation.76 If potential trading partners, or product or ser-
vice sellers, have good reputations for quality or integrity, others may feel more 
comfortable dealing with them, and actually may be willing to make economic 
concessions to do so because the underlying attribute reputed has economic 
value.77 That can be particularly important in consumer markets: Where gather-
ing information about an intended purchase is economically inefficient or re-
quires expertise beyond the buyer’s abilities (both of which are true in many 
consumer markets, and emphatically true as to legal education), reputation pro-
vides some kind of substitute for direct personal knowledge, and may be the 
only quality assessment available as a practical matter.78 
Of course, reputation is always an imperfect substitute for direct 
knowledge of the underlying attribute for all kinds of reasons. For example, the 
truth can be concealed. Reputation can be manipulated, or based on information 
that is incomplete or obsolete.79 
                                                        
76  This discussion would not be complete without the obligatory reference to Iago’s deeply 
calculating invocation of “good name” as “the immediate jewel of [our] souls,” far more 
valuable than mere pecuniary riches. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3. For a 
more contemporary assessment, see, for example, Omri Ben-Shahar, Consumer Protection 
Without Law, REGISTER, Summer 2010, at 26–27, 29–30; William P. Rogerson, Reputation 
and Product Quality, 14 BELL J. ECON. 508, 508–09 (1983). 
77  See, e.g., Paul N. Wilson & Ana M. Kennedy, Trustworthiness as an Economic Asset, 2 
INT’L FOOD & AGRIBUSINESS MGMT. REV. 179, 181 (1999). 
78  See Yonathan A. Arbel, Reputation Failure: Market Discipline and Its Limits 13 (Univ. 
Ala. Legal Studies Working Paper Series, Res. Paper No. 3239995, 2018), https://papers.ssrn 
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3239995 [https://perma.cc/56BH-FADS]; see also Oren 
Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749, 756 
(2008). To analogize, these are some of the reasons our rules of evidence allow evidence of 
Reputation to be used as proof of the underlying attribute in some circumstances (but not 
others). See FED. R. EVID. 404; FED. R. EVID. 405(a); FED. R. EVID. 608(a). 
79  Consider, for example, in recent years, Bill Cosby, Lance Armstrong, Theranos, and 
countless others great and small whose reputations were based on incomplete or misleading 
information. Or as Iago himself put it, “Reputation is an idle and most false imposition, oft 
got without merit and lost without deserving.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 2, sc. 3. 
For a detailed and deeply insightful inquiry into how and why reputation can and not infre-
quently does diverge from underlying realities, see Arbel, supra note 78, at 25–32. Indeed, 
law schools sometimes try to manipulate their entering-class Profiles because of their promi-
nent role in determining U.S. News ranking, trading Profile for Size and/or Net Tuition, and 
adding incremental students to the class in ways that do not degrade the Profile distributions 
reported median and 25th percentile. See Muller, Law School Admissions, supra note 21. 
That is one reason why we ground our analysis in three Performance Variables. 
Several years ago, two law schools, Illinois and Villanova, went further in their efforts to 
manipulate their entering-class Profiles, falsifying admissions data that resulted in sanctions 
by the ABA. See COUNCIL OF THE SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO BAR OF THE 
AM. BAR ASS’N, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS COLLEGE OF LAW CENSURE JUNE 2012 1 (2012), htt 
ps://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions
_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/2012_june_u_illinois_public_censure.pdf [http 
s://perma.cc/56MK-MV4T]; Martha Neil, ABA Raps Villanova re Inaccurate Admission Da-
ta, Says Law School Must Post Censure Online, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 15, 2011, 8:23 PM), ht 
tp://www.abajournal.com/news/article/abas_legal_ed_section_sanctions_villanova/ [https://p 
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As just discussed, here our concern is with individual law schools’ relative 
overall general reputation for quality, in the sense that an interested observer 
might say, without elaboration, that one school was “better” than another. A 
more acute observer could suggest with considerable reason that talking about a 
law school’s general overall quality might not make much sense. The concept 
would appear to invoke only an imaginary abstraction of questionable utility. 
After all, the underlying attribute—general overall quality—must draw on 
many decidedly distinct, independent, and legitimately significant attributes, 
evaluation of most of which likely varies a good deal from observer to observer 
in nature and importance. Among others, these include quality of classroom in-
struction; quality and quantity of faculty scholarship; various qualities of the 
students; quality of student life while attending; quality, variety, and specificity 
of skills and clinical programs and instruction; quality and identity of concen-
tration or certification programs; quality of the school’s placement function; 
and so on. Just as importantly, different legitimately interested constituencies 
(prospective law students; actual law students; law-school faculty and adminis-
trators at other schools; practitioners, judges, and prospective clients in the 
communities where graduates practice; etc.) will have different priorities and 
                                                                                                                                
erma.cc/97HN-G88Z]. The ABA and LSAC agreed to a process which began in 2012 by 
which LSAC would certify entering class credentials for law schools. See Letter from Susan 
L. Krinsky, Chair, & Daniel O. Bernstine, President, Law School Admissions Council, to 
Deans of LSAC Member Schools (Aug. 2, 2016), available at http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/ca 
/LSACMatriculantServiceDeans.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VCH-GNZZ]. 
One law school simply proposed its own ranking system. Elie Mystal, Latest Cooley Law 
School Rankings Achieve New Heights of Intellectual Dishonesty, ABOVE LAW (Feb. 8, 2011, 
6:23 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2011/02/latest-cooley-law-school-rankings-achieve-new-
heights-of-intellectual-dishonesty/ [http://perma.cc/EZH9-DHSX] [hereinafter Mystal, Latest 
Cooley Rankings]. In 1996, Thomas M. Cooley Law School (now Western Michigan Uni-
versity Thomas M. Cooley Law School) first proposed its own multifactor quality-ranking 
system. Other Rankings, USLEGAL, https://lawschool.uslegal.com/law-school-rankings/other 
-rankings/ [https://perma.cc/FAX2-ET4N] (last visited Feb. 20, 2019). By 2009, it used that 
system to tout itself as the twelfth-best law school in America. Elie Mystal, Cooley Law 
School Develops More Useless Than Normal Law School Rankings, ABOVE LAW (Feb. 5, 
2009, 11:08 AM), https://abovethelaw.com/2009/02/cooley-law-school-develops-more-
useless-than-normal-law-school-rankings/ [https://perma.cc/Z4Z9-8QKG] [hereinafter Mys-
tal, Cooley Develops Rankings]. By 2011, Thomas Cooley had ascended in its own ranking 
system to No. 2 nationally, behind only Harvard. Paul L. Caron, Size Matters: Thomas Coo-
ley’s 2011 Law School Rankings, TAXPROF BLOG (Feb. 9, 2011), https://taxprof.typepad.com 
/taxprof_blog/2011/02/size-matters-.html https://perma.cc/9D6S-EE5C]; Mystal, Latest Coo-
ley Rankings, supra. Thomas Cooley—which achieved the lowest 2010 Reputation Score in 
our sample using the methodology detailed in Section II.F—currently has one of the weakest 
entering-class Profiles in the country among accredited law schools and an “ultimate” bar 
passage rate (within two years of graduation) as reported to the ABA in 2017 among the ten 
worst among accredited law schools, Staci Zaretsky, The Law Schools with the Worst ‘Ulti-
mate’ Bar Pass Rates, ABOVE LAW (Apr. 10, 2018, 12:44 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/201 
8/04/the-law-schools-with-the-worst-ultimate-bar-pass-rates/ [https://perma.cc/MJU5-XM25 
]. Cooley’s self-ranking system was the subject of pointed criticism, see, e.g., Caron, supra; 
Mystal, Latest Cooley Rankings, supra, and appears to have largely disappeared from the 
school’s marketing. 
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interests bearing on what makes for “quality” in a law school, and possibly dif-
ferent perspectives on the same priorities and interests, at any given time. So 
you might forgive (or even praise) that more acute observer for asking, “Quali-
ty in what, and according to whose needs and preferences?” 
All that said, however, the simple fact is that during the Comparison Period 
at issue in our study there was continuous and widespread discourse among 
prospective law students about different schools’ relative Reputations for gen-
eral overall quality. And overwhelmingly, students reported that they relied on 
perceived relative Reputation for quality in making choices about where they 
applied and eventually matriculated.80 
Our study explores the relationship between relative Reputational strength 
and performance in the legal education market as measured by the three Per-
formance Variables we have identified. We thus must define a measure of rela-
                                                        
80  The U.S. News rankings offer themselves as a relative ranking of general overall law-
school quality. And 40 percent of the resulting ranking is directly based on a reputational 
survey among legal academics and administrators (25 percent) and lawyers and judges (15 
percent). See Morse & Hines, supra note 24. A survey of prospective LSAT takers by the 
Kaplan test preparation organization in 2016 found that for 73 percent, U.S. News rankings 
would “be an important factor in their decision[s] . . . where to apply and enroll.” See Kaplan 
Test Prep Survey: Pre-Law Students Put Heavy Emphasis on U.S. News & World Report’s 
Rankings, but Most Law School Admissions Officers Want Them Gone, KAPLAN TEST PREP 
(Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.kaptest.com/blog/press/2016/03/15/kaplan-test-prep-survey-pr 
e-law-students-put-heavy-emphasis-on-u-s-news-world-reports-rankings-but-most-law-
school-admissions-officers-want-them-gone/ [https://perma.cc/8M3H-QL6P]. The Before 
the JD Study shows similar results, particularly among those students with LSATs of 165 or 
higher, for whom “General reputation/school ranking” was the most significant factor in 
their decision of where to apply to law school. See GALLUP & ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHS., su-
pra note 25, at 54 fig.8.1. This high degree of influence in prospective law-student decision-
making prevailed throughout the Comparison Period. See Kaplan Test Prep Survey: Aspiring 
Law School Students Place Rankings Above All Else, BUSINESS WIRE (Nov. 16, 2010, 8:30 
AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20101116005536/en/Kaplan-Test-Prep-Surv 
ey-Aspiring-Law-School [https://perma.cc/H4A5-M2PJ] (stating that 86 percent of prospec-
tive LSAT takers surveyed in 2010 considered a law school’s ranking “very” or “somewhat 
important” in choosing a law school). There are multiple commercial websites at which in-
terested persons share views about the relative merits of American law schools. See, e.g., 
TOP LAW SCHOOLS, http://www.top-law-schools.com [https://perma.cc/J4G8-D28A] (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2019); LAW SCHOOL NUMBERS, http://www.lawschoolnumbers.com [https://p 
erma.cc/3FBN-WGXL] (last visited Feb. 20, 2019). 
Of course, the U.S. News rankings have long been widely and justifiably criticized for their 
methodology and reliability, as well as the perverse incentives they create for ranked 
schools. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss & William D. Henderson, Measuring Outcomes: Post-
Graduation Measures of Success in the U.S. News & World Report Law School Rankings, 
83 IND. L.J. 791, 812, 833 (2008); Nancy B. Rapoport, Ratings, Not Rankings: Why U.S. 
News & World Report Shouldn’t Want to Be Compared to Time and Newsweek—or The 
New Yorker, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 1098–99 (1999); Brian Leiter, The U.S. News Law 
School Rankings: A Guide for the Perplexed, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCHOOL RANKINGS (May 
2003), http://www.leiterrankings.com/usnews/guide.shtml [https://perma.cc/6VXL-4UYQ]. 
We do not defend them. We note only that, wisely or not, prospective law-school applicants 
have broadly relied on them to determine their application priorities and choices, and contin-
ue to do so. 
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tive Reputational strength. The U.S. News rankings, though broadly relied on 
(and, ironically, at the same time highly disparaged), do not furnish a relative 
ranking for the Reputationally weakest accredited American law schools, in-
cluding 37 of the 110 schools in our sample.81 To avoid this distortion, we rely 
instead on the insight that, all other things being equal, schools compete for the 
students with the strongest conventional qualifications, and thus create a Repu-
tation metric based on schools’ 2010 entering-student Profile.82 
For the sake of consistency, we measure Reputation in the same way as 
Profile. We use 2010 entering-class Profile as our “base” year, as the 2010 Pro-
files reflect the ability to attract particular levels of applicant strength immedi-
ately prior to the multi-year reduction in applications and applicant quality that 
is the focus of this study. Each school’s Reputation Score in 2010 (“R”) thus is 
simply:83 
R = 2010 Profile = (55% x Med P-LSAT) + (45% x Med N-UGPA) where 
Med P-LSAT = median percentile entering-class LSAT in 2010 
Med N-UGPA = median entering-class UGPA in 2010, normalized on 
a 100-point scale 
G. Methodology: Comparing Relative Reputational Strength with the Changes 
in Each Performance Variable 
Our goal is to compare law schools’ responses to the dramatic reduction in 
the number and quality of law-school applicants between 2010 and 2016, and 
to determine whether particular identifiable differences among law schools cor-
respond with different responses. To do so, we determined for each law school 
in our sample the percentage change in its Performance Variables over the 
                                                        
81  Paul Caron, 2019 U.S. News Law School Peer Reputation Rankings (And Overall Rank-
ings), TAXPROF BLOG (Mar. 20, 2018), https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2018/03/20 
19-us-news-law-school-peer-reputation-rankings-and-overall-rankings.html. In addition, the 
U.S. News rankings, where available, are on a smooth scale of successive integers that may 
not reflect compression or dilation at different ranges of the scale. See Derek Muller, Visual-
izing the 2018 U.S. News Law School Rankings—The Way They Should be Represented, 
EXCESS DEMOCRACY (Mar. 14, 2017), http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2017/3/visualizin 
g-the-2018-us-news-law-school-rankings-the-way-they-should-be-presented [https://perma.c 
c/FV9Y-DKFG]. And while reliance on the academic and professional reputation scores that 
are factors in the U.S. News rankings, see supra note 74, do not present either of these diffi-
culties, they are only a portion of the overall ranking, are suspect both in their methodology 
and poor response rate, and are surveys of populations other than the one we care about 
here—namely the prospective law students who are making decisions about whether and 
where to purchase a legal education. That said, the U.S. News rankings where available are 
very strongly correlated with the Profile-based measure we adopted. Thus use of a U.S. 
News-based Reputation metric would apparently produce no material difference in the corre-
lations discussed infra Part III.B.2. 
82  See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. 
83  The highest 2010 Reputation Score (Yale) was 98.38; the lowest (Thomas Cooley) was 
50.18 (spreadsheet with calculations on file with the authors). 
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course of the Comparison Period—as defined above, ΔProfile, ΔSize, and ΔNet 
Tuition. 
We determined the degree of correlation between each school’s relative 
Reputational strength and the change in each of its Performance Variables to 
see whether Reputational strength can predict relative changes in a school’s 
Performance Variables. We performed this analysis for the sample as a whole; 
and for the sample divided into thirds according to Reputational strength as 
measured by each school’s Reputational Score. The next Part details our find-
ings. 
III. FINDINGS: COMPETITIVE COPING STRATEGIES AND BEHAVIORS THE DATA 
ILLUSTRATE 
Our goal is to determine whether we can identify patterns in law schools’ 
competitive performance and behaviors in response to the dramatic reduction in 
the number and credentials of law school applicants between academic years 
2010–11 and 2016–17. In this Part, we identify some of our working hypothe-
ses, and test them against the empirical data. 
A. Our Working Hypotheses 
Because the market for legal education is competitive, a sudden fall in de-
mand imposes competitive pressures on and forces reactions from sellers (that 
is, law schools). Because schools compete for students (buyers) with respect to 
quality (or perceived quality), relative market strength in this market ought to 
be measurable by relative Reputational strength. Considering these forces in the 
context of the Performance Variables we identified describing market perfor-
mance (ΔProfile, ΔSize, and ΔNet Tuition)—which we stress represent the 
change in these variables for each school across the six-year Comparison Peri-
od in which the market adjusted to the 2010 market shock—we would expect to 
see that, the lower a school’s Reputational strength, the more that school will 
find itself forced to give up across all Performance Variables. 
At the same time, we predicted that the Performance Variables would not 
move in perfect concert. Any given school can to some degree trade these vari-
ables off against one another: As discussed above, a school might choose any 
of the following, singly or in combination: 
• to give up class Size in order to preserve Profile, taking a smaller class of 
more highly credentialed students (because more of such students 
would have been admitted to, and have matriculated at, Reputationally 
Stronger schools trying to fill their own shortfall from the reduced 
number of applicants); or 
• to give up Profile in order to preserve class Size, taking a larger class of 
less-well-credentialed students; or 
• to make concessions on Net Tuition by discounting tuition to “buy” high-
er-Profile matriculants, thus attempting to maintain Size and Profile. 
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The rate of tradeoff among these variables, we hypothesized, would be de-
termined by the particular tactical choices and practical circumstances of each 
law school, including not only its competitive (Reputational) and geographic 
position, but its access to sources of revenue other than tuition, which could 
make Net Tuition easier or harder to compromise.84 
Nevertheless, we expected a statistically significant correlation between 
Reputation and each individual Performance Variable. That is, we expected that 
the weaker a school’s Reputation, the more concessions that school would have 
to make on the overall combination of Performance Variables. And though a 
particular school might choose for any number of reasons to make more con-
cessions on one variable than another, we expected that overall each variable 
would tend to show a greater negative change in rough proportion to the de-
crease in Reputation, resulting in correlations between Reputation and each 
Performance Variable across the entire sample. 
As foreshadowed earlier, the data generally bear out these hypotheses, but 
with some (at least to us) surprising and enlightening exceptions. 
B. Change in Individual Performance Variables Over the Comparison Period, 
and the Relationship Between that Change and a Law School’s 
Reputational Strength 
In this Section, we examine correlations between law schools’ Reputation 
Scores and the changes in their Performance Variables and in ΔRevenue—that 
is, how much each variable moved in concert with Reputation over the Com-
parison Period. We test the correlation with Reputation Score for each Perfor-
mance Variable and ΔRevenue over the full sample of 110 private schools, as 
well as in three subgroups of our sample: the top, middle, and bottom third 
Reputationally. We show all our results here in Table 3.1, and then reproduce 
relevant lines of the table in the sections discussing those findings. 
                                                        
84  Such alternative sources of revenue could include central university support, “Rainy Day” 
funds, endowment, fundraising, and tuition from non-JD programs. At the public institutions 
we were not able to include in our sample, see supra Section II.C, it also includes subsidies 
from the state the institution is located in and serves. 
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TABLE 3.1: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN REPUTATION AND PERFORMANCE VARIABLES85 
 Full Sample 
(110 Schools) 
Reputationally 
Stronger Third 
Reputationally 
Middle Third 
Reputationally 
Weaker Third 
ΔSize 71% 
(0.00) 
70% 
(0.00) 
13% 
(0.43) 
41% 
(0.00) 
ΔProfile 49% 
(0.00) 
62% 
(0.00) 
-15% 
(0.40) 
-4% 
(0.87) 
ΔNet Tui-
tion 
6% 
(0.51) 
66% 
(0.00) 
32% 
(0.06) 
-33% 
(0.04) 
ΔRevenue 49% 
(0.00) 
75% 
(0.00) 
21% 
(0.23) 
-2% 
(0.91) 
1. Relationship Between Reputational Strength and Change in Entering-
Class Size over the Comparison Period (ΔSize) 
TABLE 3.2: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN REPUTATION AND CHANGE IN ENTERING-CLASS 
SIZE (ΔSIZE) 
 Full Sample 
(110 Schools) 
Reputationally 
Stronger Third 
Reputationally 
Middle Third 
Reputationally 
Weaker Third 
ΔSize 71% 
(0.00) 
70% 
(0.00) 
13% 
(0.43) 
41% 
(0.00) 
We find that the strongest and most consistent correlations exist between 
change in Reputational strength and entering-class Size over the Comparison 
Period, but with much weaker and non-statistically-significant correlation for 
Reputationally Middle law schools. 
Across all law schools in our sample, changes (almost universally reduc-
tions) in a law school’s entering-class Size over the course of the Comparison 
Period are correlated with the school’s Reputational strength (ρ = 71 percent). 
As we saw in Part I, the average law school reduced entering-class Size by 
nearly a third (31 percent) during the Comparison Period; in fact, only four 
schools in our 110-school sample actually increased in Size, while only two 
more remained the same. This statistical result accords with common sense: 
The weaker a law school’s Reputation, the more difficulty it would have at-
tracting students with the Profile that the school would prefer because of com-
                                                        
85  The findings in the Table are calculated from the data gathered in Appendix I. The data in 
Appendix I are gathered or derived as described in Part II, and ultimately come from the in-
formation gathered from accredited law schools and reported by the ABA. Correlation is a 
way of measuring the tendency of two sets of data to move generally in the same direction 
and proportions. The top value in each cell, represented as a percentage, is the correlation 
coefficient (ρ) for the schools in that portion of the sample between percentage change in 
that Variable over the Comparison Period and Reputation Score. The number beneath it in 
parentheses is the p value for that correlation, which represents the probability that the corre-
lation could have occurred merely by chance. A p value reported as “0.00” means that the p 
value for that correlation is less than .01. p values less than 0.05 are generally viewed as sta-
tistically significant. Statistically significant correlations in Tables 3.1–3.5 are in italics. 
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petition with Reputationally Stronger schools, and the less such a school would 
be able to maintain entering-class Size during a time when applications per 
school fell on average over 40 percent.86 
However, the correlation strength varies within different portions of the 
sample. As shown in Table 3.2, the correlation between Reputation and change 
in entering-class Size is strong across the whole sample as well as within the 
Reputationally Stronger and Weaker thirds of the sample, with the correlation 
being weaker in the Reputationally Weaker third but still statistically signifi-
cant. These variances can be explained by the practical circumstances in which 
the legal academy found itself during the Comparison Period. 
Reputationally Stronger schools consistently preferred to give up Size and 
Net Tuition rather than compromise Profile.87 This finding aligns with the in-
sight that Profile is generally seen in the market as a proxy for Reputational 
prestige. 
Among Reputationally Middle schools, change in entering-class Size has a 
lower correlation with Reputation that is not statistically significant (that is, not 
reliably different from no correlation at all). This difference is likely explained 
by the fact that, for law schools in the middle of the sample, increasing compe-
tition for students and varying circumstances resulted in more variability 
among schools as to which Performance Variables (ΔSize, ΔProfile, and/or 
ΔNet Tuition) to sacrifice, and in what relative measure. Because the tradeoffs 
vary at each school, no one Performance Variable is well correlated with Repu-
tation in this portion of the sample; some schools will choose to “spend” their 
Reputational strength predominantly on one Variable, while other schools will 
focus on others. We refer to this phenomenon as “Tradeoff Variability,” and we 
see it in all of the Performance Variables in the Reputationally Middle portion 
of the sample.88 
Reputationally Weaker schools bump up against a Regulatory Constraint: 
ABA Standard 501 requires a school to admit only “applicants who appear ca-
pable of satisfactorily completing its program of legal education and being ad-
mitted to the bar.”89 The competitively weakest schools, for which Reputational 
                                                        
86  See infra Appendix I. The four schools that increased entering class Size are consistent 
with our hypotheses. They are Yale, Vanderbilt, University of Southern California, and 
Notre Dame, whose entering-class Sizes increased between 2 and 9 percent. Stanford and 
Harvard were unchanged (spreadsheets with compiled data on file with the authors). 
87  See supra Section I.B; infra Section III.B.4. 
88  See supra Sections III.B.2–III.B.4. 
89  ABA STANDARDS, supra note 21, at 31. Standard 501(b) thus sets a generalized standard 
for anticipated student performance rather than a bright-line rule with specific numeric Pro-
file requirements. This imprecision, which may have other advantages (such as admitting for 
the possibility that some schools can achieve greater success with weaker students than oth-
ers), leaves room for schools to guess (whether honestly or opportunistically) about the rela-
tionship between future performance and Profile levels that are lower than the school may be 
accustomed to. While this may allow what amounts to gambling with weaker students’ tui-
tion dollars, it also allows some room for schools to learn how to manage and accommodate 
demographic change in their student bodies. Nevertheless, there appears to be some degree 
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prestige is largely out of reach, appear to have compromised Profile as far as 
they could to raise Revenue, but simply couldn’t find enough students who 
meet the constraint of Standard 501 to fill their classrooms.90 Accordingly, Size 
shrank the most in this portion of the sample as Reputation fell, but not as con-
sistently relative to Reputation as among the Reputationally Stronger schools. 
Figure 3.1 is a scatterplot of Reputational Score against change in entering-
class Size (the data summarized above in Table 3.2). It shows that while most 
of the Reputationally Stronger schools saw class Sizes fall by 25 percent or 
less, the Reputationally Middle and Reputationally Weaker schools had a 
broader distribution of Size changes (represented by a wider scatter on the left 
side of the graph). 
FIGURE 3.1: CORRELATION BETWEEN 2010 REPUTATION VS CHANGE IN ENTERING CLASS 
SIZE FROM 2010–16 
                                                                                                                                
of consensus that, at any given school, there is a bottom limit somewhere for LSAT and 
UGPA beneath which it does not generally appear students are capable of making it. See, 
e.g., David Frakt, The ABA and the LSAT: How Low is Too Low?, FACULTY LOUNGE (Nov. 
18, 2017), http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2017/11/how-low-is-too-low.html [https://perma 
.cc/G77D-GMMR]. 
90  Some of the Reputationally Weaker schools apparently went too far in this regard. Rec-
ord-low entering class Profile, rising attrition rates and falling bar-passage rates have 
prompted the ABA to impose sanctions on several law schools ranging from notices of non-
compliance to complete withdrawal of accreditation. See Accreditation Archives, ABA 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/accreditation/accreditation_archives/ [ 
https://perma.cc/AW6Y-JQ3V] (last visited Feb. 20, 2019); Kristen Rasmussen, 10 Law 
Schools Sanctioned by ABA for Lax Admissions, LAW.COM (Nov. 21, 2017, 4:21 PM), https:/ 
/www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/11/21/10-law-schools-sanctioned-by-aba-for-lax-admissi 
ons-outcomes/ [https://perma.cc/T4RN-QSZF]. 
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2. Relationship Between Reputational Strength and Change in Entering-
Class LSAT and UGPA over the Comparison Period (ΔProfile) 
TABLE 3.3: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN REPUTATION AND CHANGE IN ENTERING-CLASS 
PROFILE (ΔPROFILE) 
 Full Sample 
(110 Schools) 
Reputationally 
Stronger Third 
Reputationally 
Middle Third 
Reputationally 
Weaker Third 
ΔProfile 49% 
(0.00) 
62% 
(0.00) 
-15% 
(0.40) 
-4% 
(0.87) 
We find that change in entering-class Profile over the Comparison Period 
is correlated with relative school Reputation, but predominantly among the 
Reputationally Stronger schools. 
Across all law schools in our sample, changes in entering-class Profile over 
the course of the Comparison Period (again almost universally reductions) are 
correlated with the school’s Reputational strength (ρ = 49 percent). But the cor-
relation is concentrated among Reputationally Stronger schools, which when 
considered separately show a statistically significant correlation (ρ = 62 per-
cent). This statistical finding makes practical sense in that the Reputationally 
Stronger schools have continued their historical focus on attracting the highest-
Profile students, and have proved willing to sacrifice Size and Net Tuition to do 
so.91 
Considered as separate populations, the Reputationally Middle and Reputa-
tionally Weaker schools show no meaningful correlation between Reputation 
and Profile. For the Reputationally Middle third, Tradeoff Variability is again 
the likely explanation—Reputationally Middle schools chose a wider range of 
different tradeoffs among Size, Profile, and Net Tuition, resulting in no statisti-
cally-significant correlation between ΔProfile and Reputation within this group. 
Among the Reputationally Weaker schools, there also may be much less con-
sistent attention to Profile, given that rankings gains for these schools often are 
not a high priority. Regulatory Constraints, namely Standard 501, probably also 
explain the lack of correlation among Reputationally Weaker schools: some 
Reputationally Weaker schools were already close to bottom Profile limits im-
posed as a practical matter by Standard 501, and thus could not reduce their 
                                                        
91  See supra Section III.B.1. Only three schools in our sample were able to maintain or in-
crease their entering-class Profile between 2010 and 2016. Those schools are Stanford, Lib-
erty, and Detroit Mercy; Harvard and Yale maintained Profile at 2010 levels. Stanford, Har-
vard, and Yale are consistent with our hypothesis, in that their leading Reputations accorded 
them the market power to maintain Profile. The other two schools lie among the Reputation-
ally Weaker portion of our sample, but have distinctive situations that likely explain their 
unusual, and unusually successful, emphasis on improving Profile. See infra Section III.B.3 
(discussing pricing advantages some Reputationally Weaker schools appear to have exploit-
ed). 
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Profile much further, or as much as they might have been willing to absent the 
constraint.92 
Figure 3.2 is a scatterplot of Reputational Score against change in entering-
class Profile (the data summarized above in Table 3.3), with a best-fit curve. 
The widening scatter of ΔProfile as Reputation falls (toward the left of the 
graph) is even more visible in this distribution than in Figure 3.1 (charting 
ΔSize), and is probably explained by the factors just discussed.93 
FIGURE 3.2: CORRELATION BETWEEN 2010 REPUTATION VS CHANGE IN PROFILE FROM 
2010–16 
3. Relationship Between Reputational Strength and Change in Average 
Actual Tuition Per Student over the Comparison Period (ΔNet Tuition) 
TABLE 3.4: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN REPUTATION AND CHANGE IN AVERAGE ACTUAL 
TUITION PER STUDENT (ΔNET TUITION) 
 Full Sample 
(110 Schools) 
Reputationally 
Strongest Third 
Reputationally 
Middle Third 
Reputationally 
Weakest Third 
ΔNet Tu-
ition 
6% 
(0.51) 
66% 
(0.00) 
32% 
(0.06) 
-33% 
(0.04) 
                                                        
92  See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. Some of these Reputationally Weaker 
schools also appear to have surrendered a great deal of Size in an effort to maintain Profile 
compliant with the minimum requirements of Standard 501(b). Thomas Cooley and Appala-
chian shrank over the Comparison Period by more than 70 percent, and Florida Coastal by 
more than 60 percent. All three still ended up subjected to ABA sanctions of one kind or an-
other. See Frakt, supra note 89. 
93  The two significant outliers in the upper left quadrant, with unexpectedly strong Profile 
improvements, are Liberty and Detroit Mercy, both of which are discussed supra note 91. 
But even if we take out these two schools, the correlation between Reputation and ΔProfile 
is far lower, and the scatter much greater, on the Reputationally Weaker (left) side of the dis-
tribution. 
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We find that change in average Net Tuition per student over the Compari-
son Period is not correlated with relative school Reputation generally (ρ = 6 
percent), but is well correlated among the Reputationally Stronger law schools 
and, surprisingly, negatively correlated among the Reputationally Weaker 
schools (ρ = -33 percent). 
This result seems counterintuitive: We would have expected that, like 
ΔSize and ΔProfile, as the number of applications fell, and competitive pres-
sures increased, the Reputationally Stronger schools would have been most 
able to maintain Net Tuition, and the Reputationally Weaker schools least able 
to do so. This result would have been consistent with the fact that, generally, 
consumers will insist on paying lower prices for substitutes perceived to be of 
lower quality. And in fact, that correlation appears strongly among the Reputa-
tionally Stronger schools (ρ = 66 percent). But considered as separate popula-
tions, the Reputationally Middle schools show a weaker (and non-statistically 
significant) correlation, and the Reputationally Weaker schools show a negative 
correlation to a statistically significant degree. In other words, some of the 
weakest schools Reputationally were able to discount tuition less over the 
course of the Comparison Period than many of their stronger competitors. 
These initially puzzling results become easier to appreciate when viewed as 
a scatterplot of Reputational Score against change in average Net Tuition per 
student (again, the data summarized above in Table 3.4): 
FIGURE 3.3: CORRELATION BETWEEN 2010 REPUTATION AND CHANGE IN NET TUITION 
FROM 2010–16 
The quadratic (smile) shape of the best-fit curve suggests some practical 
explanations: the Reputationally Stronger schools were able to maintain or in-
crease average Net Tuition per student. Many law schools in this group do ne-
gotiate Net Tuition (scholarships); the stronger the school’s Reputation, how-
ever, the better its bargaining position and ability to maintain Net Tuition 
without losing candidates. Reputationally Middle schools, consistent with our 
theory of Tradeoff Variability, found themselves making a range of different 
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choices among Size, Profile, and Net Tuition depending on their circumstances, 
resulting in no statistically significant correlation between Reputation and Net 
Tuition among this cohort. While the degree of discounting varied, however, 
these Reputationally Middle schools generally suffered in the competition for 
students in a declining market, seeing the largest average percentage decline in 
Net Tuition of the three subgroups (-16 percent, as compared with -6 percent 
for the Reputationally Weaker third).94 
As for why some of the Reputationally Weaker schools would, apparently 
perversely, be able to maintain or even raise their average Net Tuition in the 
face of a competitive shock, we offer the Limited Options Effect. It has two 
components: first, circumstances particular to some Reputationally Weaker 
schools may blunt pricing pressures on those schools. Many of the weakest ap-
plicants admitted to Reputationally Weaker law schools likely have been admit-
ted only to Reputationally Weaker schools and, we would guess, not infre-
quently to only one.95 These schools are much less focused on pursuing Profile 
to enhance their rankings and Reputation, so they have little incentive to offer 
scholarships to attract stronger students. And they would be particularly disin-
clined to negotiate on Net Tuition with weaker applicants because those stu-
dents have only very limited options available to them if they wish to try to be-
come lawyers.96 
Second, there is a social status dynamic that also may be at work. For stu-
dents from lower socioeconomic strata (who because of reduced access to edu-
cational and social opportunities during their formative years are disproportion-
ately represented among weaker students at Reputationally Weaker schools),97 
entry into a learned profession is still viewed as a traditional path of upward 
mobility and an attractive social status enhancement. These values may sup-
                                                        
94  See supra Table 1.1. 
95  LSAC has data indicating that those applying to one or only a few law schools tend to 
have a lower mean LSAT, suggesting that students on the low end of the LSAT distribution 
may truly have limited options, either self-imposed (by applying only to one or two or three 
law schools) or by circumstance (getting admitted to only one law school). See RICHARD 
STROUS-ROONEY & KIMBERLY DUSTMAN, NATIONAL APPLICANT TRENDS—2017, at 4 
(LSAC), https://www.lsac.org/system/files/inline-files/National%20Applicant%20Trends_20 
17.pdf [https://perma.cc/68AH-HKGV]. 
96  The economically-minded reader might suggest that, in a market with multiple Reputa-
tionally Weaker schools admitting students unlikely to be admitted elsewhere, there still 
should have been price competition (that is, competitive discounting of tuition) among those 
schools willing to admit the weakest students. But weaker students apparently tend to limit 
their applications or matriculation geographically—they tend to apply only to schools near 
home, or at least hold a strong geographic preference to attend a school that doesn’t require 
them to move, which of course offers significant financial savings relative to a comparable-
quality but geographically distant school. See supra notes 66, 95. 
97  See Chad Christensen, LSSSE Project Manager, and Jerry Organ, Professor of Law and 
Co-Director of the Holloran Center for Ethical Leadership in the Professions, University of 
St. Thomas School of Law, Scholarships and Access to the Legal Profession for Minorities 
and Low-Income Students at AccessLex Institute Research Symposium (Nov. 9, 2017) 
(presentation on file with author). 
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plement economic concerns in a student’s career-choice calculus so that even 
when the risk-discounted return on investment in a law degree is questionable 
(given the lower bar passage rates and worse employment outcomes at some of 
these Reputationally Weaker law schools, especially for their weaker students), 
the student may feel more inclined to take the risk.98 With almost unlimited 
amounts of student loan money available, the student succumbs to optimism 
bias and hyperbolic discounting (the tendency to underweight the significance 
of payments that do not have to be made until several years in the future), and 
accepts the undiscounted tuition demand of the Limited Option school rather 
than forgo law school altogether. 
4. Relationship Between Reputational Strength and Change in Total 
Tuition Revenue Per Year over the Comparison Period (ΔRevenue) 
TABLE 3.5: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN REPUTATION AND CHANGE IN TOTAL TUITION 
REVENUE PER YEAR 
 Full Sample 
(110 Schools) 
Reputationally 
Strongest Third 
Reputationally 
Middle Third 
Reputationally 
Weakest Third 
ΔRevenue 49% 
(0.00) 
75% 
(0.00) 
21% 
(0.23) 
-2% 
(0.91) 
We find that change in Tuition Revenue per school over the Comparison 
Period is correlated with relative school Reputation generally (ρ = 49 percent). 
Considering the sample in separate Reputational subgroups, Reputation and 
ΔRevenue are strongly correlated among the Reputationally Stronger law 
schools, but not statistically significantly correlated in either of the bottom two 
subgroups.99 
Figure 3.4 on the next page provides a scatterplot of Reputational Score 
against change in total Tuition Revenue. 
                                                        
98  See Milan Markovic & Gabriele Plickert, The Paradox of Minority Attorney Satisfaction 
16–21 (Jan. 31, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab 
stract_id=3205344 [https://perma.cc/SM3M-7HQP] (suggesting that minority attorneys may 
find status and satisfaction that compensates for some economic concerns in service to and 
corresponding recognition among their communities); Jerry Organ, Understanding Trends in 
Demographics of Law Students—Part Three, LEGAL WHITEBOARD (Nov. 24, 2013), http://la 
wprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2013/11/understanding-trends-in-demographics-o 
f-law-students-part-three.html [https://perma.cc/9GRR-QLA9]. 
99  To reiterate our category definitions, Revenue is not strictly an arithmetic function of Net 
Tuition and Size. Size counts the entering class only, while Revenue is calculated on the ba-
sis of Net Tuition paid by all JD students enrolled in the entire JD program in any given aca-
demic year. Revenue, thus, takes into account student transfers and changes in scholarships 
after the first year. See supra note 65. 
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FIGURE 3.4: CORRELATION BETWEEN 2010 REPUTATION VS CHANGE IN TUITION 
REVENUE FROM 2010–16 
The relationship between Reputation and change in Tuition Revenue over 
the Comparison Period appears to be explained by the same phenomena we 
suggest have influenced the Performance Variables. The Reputationally 
Stronger schools have the easiest time holding overall student census and Net 
Tuition at customary levels. As this power sinks across this population, Reve-
nue changes to a greater degree. For Reputationally Middle law schools, 
Tradeoff Variability leaves no one Performance Variable consistently correlat-
ed with Reputation.100 
For Reputationally Weaker law schools, the Limited Options Effect allows 
some of the Reputationally Weaker schools to maintain or raise their average 
Net Tuition per student.101 But at the same time, these law schools feel the ef-
fects of Regulatory Constraints—they tend to have a harder time maintaining 
Size because there are not enough Standard-501-compliant students available to 
do so.102 Thus for Reputationally Weaker law schools, the two factors that 
combine to produce total Tuition Revenue (Net Tuition per student and total 
number of students) don’t always move in tandem, with the result that Net Tui-
tion may hold or go up,103 but Revenue may go up less, or fall. Over the whole 
sample, then, Revenue and Reputation are correlated, but as the best-fit curve 
in Figure 3.4 illustrates, because of pricing advantages conferred by the Lim-
ited Options Effect, some Reputationally Weaker institutions also had an easier 
time maintaining Tuition Revenue than many better-regarded schools. 
                                                        
100  See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
101  See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
102  See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
103  See supra Figure 3.3. 
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The correlations between Reputation and Revenue also show another im-
portant pattern: Reputationally Stronger schools tend to hold on to Profile at the 
expense of Size and/or Net Tuition. We can infer this tendency from the fact 
that the Reputationally Stronger law schools have the most power to preserve 
Revenue; Revenue is statistically significantly correlated with Reputation 
across the entire sample, and strongly correlated among the Reputationally 
Stronger law schools.104 Strong correlations between Reputation and both Size 
and Net Tuition (both significant components of Revenue) also prevail among 
the Reputationally Stronger schools.105 Yet the average Reputationally Stronger 
law school gave up substantial Revenue over the Comparison Period—on aver-
age about $5.9 million annually per school.106 Given the choice between Profile 
and either Size or Net Tuition (which together make up most of what deter-
mines Revenue), these schools chose Profile. 
Put a little differently, the Reputationally Stronger schools gave up some 
entering-class Size that they didn’t have to—more applicants would have ac-
cepted their offers of enrollment had these Stronger schools been willing to dip 
deeper into the applicant pool and accept some students with lower-than-
accustomed Profile. But the Reputationally Stronger schools chose to lower 
their Profile standards only modestly (or not at all), and accepted reductions in 
Size (and to some degree Net Tuition) in an effort to preserve Profile as much 
as possible relative to peer institutions. This decision effectively left more ap-
plicants (with somewhat weaker Profiles) available to Reputationally Middle 
and Weaker schools. 
IV. OBSERVATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The findings just discussed have important implications for the current 
state, and probable future, of the American legal academy. We discuss those 
implications here. 
A. Reputationally Stronger Schools’ Drive to Preserve Profile at the Expense 
of Size Likely Prevented as Many as Twenty Weaker Schools from Being 
Forced to Close 
As just discussed, the Reputationally Stronger law schools sought to pre-
serve Profile at the expense of Size and Net Tuition, taking smaller classes of 
students in an effort to minimize erosion of LSATs and UGPAs rather than 
welcoming larger classes of weaker students.107 The reason is not hard to infer: 
Profile is a 22.5 percent factor in a school’s U.S. News ranking, which is a 
measure of Reputation for relative general quality widely relied on by prospec-
                                                        
104  See supra Table 3.5. 
105  See supra Table 3.1; see also Taylor, supra note 58, at 333–36. 
106  See supra Table 1.1. 
107  See supra Section III.B.1, Table 1.1, Figure 3.1. 
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tive law students in choosing a school.108 In contrast, neither entering-class Size 
nor Net Tuition (per se) has a direct effect on rankings.109 And even though 
Reputationally Stronger schools gave up Size over Profile, their relative Repu-
tational Strength still allowed them to decrease in Size much less than Reputa-
tionally Middle or Reputationally Weaker law schools. As a result, the top third 
of our sample Reputationally shrank its entering-class Size on average by 13 
percent during the Comparison Period, while the bottom third shrank its enter-
ing-class Size on average by 46 percent.110 
These choices on the part of Reputationally Stronger law schools have im-
portant implications for the Reputationally Middle and Reputationally Weaker 
law schools. Suppose that the law schools in the top half of our sample had 
chosen to keep entering-class Sizes the same, and had made the necessary sac-
rifices in Profile and Price to do so.111 This would have pulled roughly 3,300 
prospective students who ended up enrolling at bottom-half schools into 
schools in the top half, resulting in an average of 102 students per entering 
class in bottom-half schools in our sample as opposed to the 164 students per 
class that those schools actually matriculated. That shortfall of over 3,300 en-
tering students for the bottom-half schools in our sample of 110 law schools 
amounts to the entire average entering class of at least 20 such law schools!112 
While it’s impossible to know how many weaker schools would have down-
sized further and tried to soldier on, and how many would have been forced to 
close outright, we can safely say that stronger law schools’ focus on preserving 
entering-class Profile prevented widespread devastation among Reputationally 
Middle and Weaker schools, and almost certainly forestalled numerous failures. 
B. Many Law Schools Gave Up Millions of Dollars in Tuition to Preserve 
Their General Reputation for Quality Rather than Improve Their Programs 
As shown above, the average law school shrank its entering-class Size by 
nearly a third (31 percent), while the actual average Net Tuition paid per stu-
dent across our sample generally fell modestly in real terms.113 At the same 
time, as just discussed, Reputationally Stronger schools tended to preserve Pro-
file at the expense of Size as a means of preserving Reputation. Enrolling fewer 
students at a lower Net Tuition has an easily predictable effect on Tuition Rev-
enue—at most schools in our sample, it fell. On average, 2016 Tuition Revenue 
                                                        
108  See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
109  Size is a factor in overall JD student census, and expenditures per student and student-
faculty ratios are factors in a school’s U.S. News ranking. See Morse & Hines, supra note 24. 
So Size does have some indirect effect on U.S. News rankings, all other things being equal. 
110  See supra Table 1.1. 
111  The authors thank Brett Scharffs of Brigham Young University J. Reuben Clark Law 
School for sharing this perspective with Professor Organ in September 2014. 
112  Calculations on file with the authors. 
113  See supra note 99 and accompanying text, Table. 1.1. 
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was about $5.9 million lower than in 2010 for Reputationally Stronger 
schools.114 
As a practical matter, this implies that many Reputationally Stronger law 
schools chose to sacrifice millions of dollars in Tuition Revenue per year in or-
der to preserve Profile as a means of maintaining their Reputation for relative 
quality. Theoretically these millions could have been collected by restructuring 
first-year admissions criteria to maintain more Size with some sacrifice in Pro-
file. That additional Tuition Revenue could then have been spent on faculty, 
facilities, curricular innovations, and labor-intensive teaching and student sup-
port, including clinical and skills instruction, and academic success and career 
services support. Or it could have been used to reduce the cost of a legal educa-
tion (and resulting debt load) for those lacking personal or family resources. 
It is worth asking whether the investment choice that most law schools 
made in this regard was a wise one. We suggest no answer to the question here, 
and concede the possibility that these sacrifices might have been necessary to 
preserve the quality these law schools already enjoyed in the prevailing com-
petitive environment. But as a practical matter, the best-regarded law schools in 
the country decided to buy students with higher LSATs and UGPAs rather than 
expand their faculties, facilities, or access to clinical and experiential education. 
And the issue has not even been widely discussed. 
C. The Cost of Legal Education Has Been Imposed More and More 
Disproportionately on Those Least Likely to Be Able to Bear It 
As shown above, over the course of the Comparison Period actual average 
Net Tuition per student fell modestly, while Base or “sticker price” Tuition in-
creased on average 15 percent. Because some students do pay full freight, the 
range of prices students paid for a legal education has increased significantly 
over that time. And because almost all scholarship aid at almost all law schools 
is “merit-” (that is, predominantly Profile-) based, overwhelmingly the weakest 
students receive the least aid, and pay the highest Net Tuition.115 Worse, the 
weakest students, especially at Reputationally Weaker schools, are most at risk 
of not obtaining a law-related job, or of obtaining a law job that pays less than 
other law graduates’.116 
Several conclusions are inevitable: Those students who pay the most for a 
legal education generally are least likely to be able to make any direct use of 
the education they have paid for. And even if they do find a law job, they are 
                                                        
114  See supra note 99 and accompanying text, Table. 1.1. 
115  See Organ, Net Tuition, supra note 25, at 74; Karen Sloan, Minority Law Students Subsi-
dize Scholarships, Study Finds, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 9, 2017, 2:09 PM), https://www.law.com/na 
tionallawjournal/almID/1202778852592/minority-law-students-subsidize-scholarships-study 
-finds/ [https://perma.cc/Y3DN-KVR3]; see also Aaron N. Taylor, Making State Merit 
Scholarship Programs More Equitable and Less Vulnerable, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 155, 167–
70 (2015) (discussing the phenomenon in higher education generally). 
116  See Organ, Net Tuition, supra note 25, at 66–70. 
19 NEV. L.J. 583, BURK ET AL. 4/25/2019  8:25 PM 
630 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:2 
least likely to find a job that economically justifies and supports the amounts 
they paid. Moreover, both of these inequalities have increased significantly 
over the Comparison Period.117 
D. The Discrepancy Between Student Needs and Law-School Resources Has 
Widened 
As discussed above, Tuition Revenue fell substantially at most law schools 
during the Comparison Period because of tuition discounting and class-size re-
ductions. Beyond the Reputationally Stronger law schools, Tuition Revenue 
fell over 40 percent on average, costing most schools $11 million to $12 mil-
lion per year.118 At the same time, Profile fell noticeably at most law schools, 
and substantially at many. Again, beyond the Reputationally Stronger schools, 
median LSAT scores dropped 14–15 percentiles.119 Profile attempts to, and to 
some degree does, measure readiness for law school (at least as currently con-
figured) by reflecting some combination of academic talent, skills, preparation, 
and acculturation of entering students. 
In short, the demographics of many schools are changing, and there are un-
precedented numbers of students who would appear to need different or better 
teaching and curriculum, and in many cases extra-academic support, to suc-
ceed. Yet at the same time, schools have unprecedentedly depleted levels of re-
sources available to meet these needs. Redoubling the irony inherent in current 
tuition-discounting strategies, it is the weakest students who are not only gener-
ally paying the most for law degrees from which they will realize questionable 
value, but whose disproportionate financial contributions are often being allo-
cated to educational resources other than the ones that they are more likely to 
need to succeed.120 We are likely seeing the effects of this widening gap in the 
deteriorating bar exam results being reported across the country from 2014 
through 2016 and, after brief improvement, in 2018.121 
                                                        
117  Id. at 65–71. And because most of these students have, to cover these costs, incurred 
large student loans that are not dischargeable in bankruptcy other than in very rare and ex-
treme circumstances, see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012), many are effectively financially ru-
ined for life. 
118  See supra Table 1.1. 
119  See supra Table 1.1. 
120  See supra Section IV.C. 
121  See David Frakt, Recent Bar Pass Rates—A Cautionary Tale, FACULTY LOUNGE (Nov. 5, 
2018, 7:07 PM), https://www.thefacultylounge.org/2018/11/recent-bar-pass-rates-a-cautionar 
y-tale.html [https://perma.cc/T8RW-TVGU]; Derek T. Muller, February 2018 MBE Bar 
Scores Collapse to All-Time Record Low in Test History, EXCESS DEMOCRACY (Apr. 19, 
2018), http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2018/4/february-2018-mbe-bar-scores-collapse-t 
o-all-time-record-low-in-test-history [https://perma.cc/F4E3-Y8J9]; Karen Sloan, Multistate 
Bar Exam Scores Sink to 34-Year Low, Pass Rates Sag, LAW.COM (Sept. 17, 2018, 2:50 PM), 
https://www.law.com/2018/09/17/multistate-bar-exam-scores-sink-to-34-year-low-pass-rates 
-sag/ [https://perma.cc/D2ZF-9XZJ]. 
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CONCLUSION 
The substantial contraction in the job market for new law graduates that 
began after 2007 has worked a sea-change on the number and qualifications of 
those considering law school. These changes have in turn transformed the de-
mographics and economics of most American law schools. Driven by its par-
ticular combination of financial, practical, and market strengths and weakness-
es, each law school has responded to this sudden and drastic reduction in 
demand with a package of fiscal and demographic adjustments that can be 
quantified in three Performance Variables: entering-class qualifications (“Pro-
file”), entering-class Size, and pricing variation in the form of selective tuition-
discounting by scholarship (“Net Tuition”). 
While a handful of super-elite institutions have remained largely unaffect-
ed, for the vast majority of law schools the effects have been somewhere be-
tween significant and devastating. Numerous law schools have tried to reduce 
costs by attrition, buyouts, or outright layoffs of faculty or staff.122 A number of 
law schools have failed;123 several more are struggling;124 large numbers of 
                                                        
122  See, e.g., Paul Caron, Law Schools Have Shed 986 Full-Time Faculty (11%) Since 2010, 
TAXPROF BLOG (Dec. 19, 2014), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2014/12/law-scho 
ols-have-shed-.html [https://perma.cc/YSH7-HX3R]; Elizabeth Crisp, LSU Law Center Of-
fers Buyouts to 7 Professors as Interest in Law Schools Dwindles Nationally, ADVOCATE 
(Jan. 22, 2015, 7:06 AM), http://theadvocate.com/news/11137666-123/law-center-plans-buy 
outs [https://perma.cc/M6ZC-ZQ97]; Katy Savage, Vermont Law School Restructuring Fac-
ulty, VTDIGGER (June 25, 2018), https://vtdigger.org/2018/06/25/vermont-law-school-restruc 
turing-faculty/ [https://perma.cc/5Q67-HDUG]; Staci Zaretsky, Law School Offers Buyouts 
to Tenured Faculty Thanks to Sharp Decline in Enrollment, ABOVE LAW (Feb. 29, 2016, 
1:01 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2016/02/law-school-offers-buyouts-to-tenured-faculty-tha 
nks-to-sharp-decline-in-enrollment/ [https://perma.cc/XSP5-LGYD]; Staci Zaretsky, Large-
Scale Layoffs Come to Cooley Law School, ABOVE LAW (Aug. 15, 2014, 10:07 AM), http://a 
bovethelaw.com/2014/08/large-scale-layoffs-come-to-cooley-law-school/ [https://perma.cc/ 
EB6P-PZF9]. These adjustments have by no means been limited to Reputationally Middle or 
Reputationally Weaker law schools. Northwestern, 2017 US News rank eleven, and holder of 
the sixth-highest 2010 Reputation Score in our sample, recently announced faculty and staff 
cutbacks. Karen Sloan, Northwestern Law Dean Cites School’s ‘Difficult Time’ as Reason 
for Faculty Cuts, LAW.COM (Nov. 5, 2018, 5:10 PM), https://www.law.com/2018/11/05/nort 
hwestern-law-dean-cites-schools-difficult-time-as-reason-for-faculty-cuts/ [https://perma.cc/ 
RXP3-4EHK]. As the preceding discussion shows, however, the greater a law school’s Rep-
utational strength, generally the less it is likely to have been affected by the demand shock. 
Reputationally Stronger schools likewise tend to have an easier time raising money among 
alumni and other interested constituencies to help make up tuition shortfalls. See Karen 
Sloan, Northwestern Law is Paring Back Amid Budget Woes. Are Other Elite Schools Next?, 
LAW.COM (Nov. 8, 2018, 2:44 PM), https://www.law.com/2018/11/08/northwestern-law-is-p 
aring-back-amid-budget-woes-are-other-elite-schools-next/ [https://perma.cc/95JK-BQXY]. 
123  See, e.g., Karen Sloan, Valparaiso Is Latest to Join the Crowd of Defunct Law Schools, 
LAW.COM (Oct. 31, 2018, 1:21 PM), https://www.law.com/2018/10/31/valparaiso-is-latest-
to-join-the-crowd-of-defunct-law-schools/ [https://perma.cc/3PZE-DD4D]; Karen Sloan, 
Whittier Law School’s Collapse Won’t Be the Last: Experts, LAW.COM (Apr. 20, 2017, 3:36 
PM), http://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/04/20/whittier-law-schools-collapse-wont-be-t 
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others no longer appear to be self-sustaining;125 and even many highly-regarded 
institutions find themselves fighting to maintain their customary levels of stu-
dent and educational quality. 
Some administrators and faculty have faced these challenges with courage 
and creativity, and there are innovations scattered about the academy that de-
serve note and emulation.126 But far more appear to be either in denial or so ab-
sorbed in staving off the impact of changing circumstances year to year that 
they have not even tried to develop tactics or strategy for a sustainable longer 
term. Faculty at many institutions are compounding the problem by abusing the 
beneficial traditions of tenure and shared governance to blindly resist any 
change that would require them to share any part of the burden. 
We need to be blunt: change is hard, and never costless. But there is no 
more time to pretend that this demographic and economic transformation is just 
some transient episode that can simply be waited out.127 Most law schools that 
are losing money, or seeing their graduation, bar-passage, or employment rates 
fall to embarrassing levels, are encountering growing impatience from key con-
stituencies including federal and state policymakers, regulators, university ad-
ministrators, prospective and current students, and alumni. The choice for most 
law schools is rapidly simplifying to one between developing organically in 
ways devised and driven from within, and suffering what will likely be painful 
and ill-tailored modifications imposed from outside. 
Our purpose in this Article has been to describe and quantify the differ-
ences between the environment and conditions of legal education today com-
pared with several short years ago. Understanding the nature and extent of the 
challenges the academy faces would seem to be a necessary first step in ad-
                                                                                                                                
he-last-experts/ [https://perma.cc/7RN7-ZL6D]; Staci Zaretsky, Charlotte Law Finally Gets 
Around to Telling Students the School Is Closing, ABOVE LAW (Aug. 24, 2017, 2:31 PM), htt 
p://abovethelaw.com/2017/08/charlotte-law-finally-gets-around-to-telling-students-the-schoo 
l-is-closing/ [https://perma.cc/8NBY-WYJS]. 
124  See supra note 90 (discussing law schools sanctioned by the ABA). 
125  Many law schools that, in better times had contributed surpluses to their universities, 
now depend on university subsidies to operate. For example, the University of Minnesota 
Law School, a highly ranked and nationally respected institution, has received millions of 
dollars in subsidies from the University of Minnesota in recent years as its first-year enroll-
ment has declined. Maura Lerner, University of Minnesota Law School Seeks Subsidies to 
Maintain Top Ranking, STARTRIBUNE (May 28, 2018, 10:30 AM), http://www.startribune.co 
m/university-of-minnesota-law-school-seeks-subsidies-to-maintain-top-ranking/483829781/ 
[https://perma.cc/N3S5-VS63]. See generally Paul Campos, 80% to 85% of ABA Law 
Schools Are Currently Losing Money, LAWYERS, GUNS, & MONEY (Nov. 12, 2013, 9:42 
AM), http://www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2013/11/80-to-85-of-aba-law-schools-are-cur 
rently-losing-money [https://perma.cc/PX6E-E2CM]. 
126  For a survey of some recent efforts at innovation, see generally Christine Cimini et al., 
Creative Initiatives at U.S. Law Schools: Report of the Working Group on Creative Initia-
tives, 7 ELON L. REV. 57 (2015). 
127  As discussed above, we note the increase in applicants in the 2018–19 admissions cycle, 
but view it as unsustainable in light of the unrelenting constraints in the new-graduate job 
market. See supra note 50. 
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dressing them, and we hope this helps. We have no reason to believe that there 
is anything remotely resembling a universal solution. Beyond long-overdue tac-
tical improvements in the efficiency and utility of the education law schools de-
liver, there are essential strategic inquiries that we believe are being widely ig-
nored or poorly thought through. These inquiries require difficult introspection 
toward a meaningful sense of institutional purpose and mission, and a thought-
ful and realistic identification of the students and communities that each law 
school predominantly serves.128 Given the differing strengths, resources, and 
needs each institution brings to the field of play, we suspect that meaningful 
adjustment will be piecemeal, incremental, cumulative, and broadly experi-
mental, with unpredictable pressures and incentives from outside the legal 
academy itself. 
But the one thing we feel sure of is that, for most American law schools, 
the only thing worse than changing will be not changing. So let’s get busy. 
                                                        
128  For one thoughtful perspective on the identity and business-model choices available as a 
practical matter, see Richard A. Matasar, The Rise and Fall of American Legal Education, 49 
N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 465, 467, 504 (2004) (suggesting that, other than a handful of law 
schools that can depend on either their very high prestige or their very low cost to distinguish 
them, the challenge for the great majority is to rethink their models to provide students value 
commensurate with their cost); see also Nancy B. Rapoport, Changing the Modal Law 
School: Rethinking U.S. Legal Education in (Most) Schools, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1119, 
1123–43 (2012) (discussing how law schools’ needs for change often depend on their cir-
cumstances). 
19 NEV. L.J. 583, BURK ET AL. 4/25/2019  8:25 PM 
  634 
APPENDIX I: YEAR-BY-YEAR WEIGHTED AVERAGES DURING THE COMPARISON PERIOD OF COMPONENTS OF PERFORMANCE 
VARIABLES ACROSS ENTIRE SAMPLE AND IN THIRDS BY REPUTATION (TUITION FIGURES BOTH AS DISCLOSED AND IN 
CONSTANT 2018 DOLLARS) 
TABLE A.I.1: COMPOSITE (FULL TIME & PART TIME) MATRICULATING CLASS IN EACH YEAR, ACROSS PRIVATE LAW SCHOOLS (N = 110) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total Applications 336,451 299,578 263,262 218,240 204,809 199,752 199,243 
Annual % change  -11% -12% -17% -6% -4% 2% 
Cumulative % change  -11% -22% -35% -39% -42% -41% 
        
Total Matriculants 32,541 29,691 26,900 24,451 23,264 22,353 22,387 
Annual % change  -9% -9% -9% -5% -4% 0% 
Cumulative % change  -9% -17% -25% -29% -31% -31% 
        
Weighted average median LSAT 158 157 157 156 156 156 156 
Weighted average median percentile LSAT129 74 70 70 67 67 67 67 
Weighted average median GPA 3.38 3.37 3.36 3.35 3.36 3.36 3.39 
        
Weighted average 75th centile LSAT 160 160 160 159 159 158 159 
Weighted average 75th centile LSAT (percentiles) 80 80 80 77 77 74 77 
Weighted average 75th centile GPA 3.59 3.58 3.57 3.56 3.57 3.57 3.59 
        
Weighted average 25th centile LSAT 155 154 154 153 153 153 153 
Weighted average 25th centile LSAT (percentiles) 63 60 60 56 56 56 56 
Weighted average 25th centile GPA 3.11 3.10 3.09 3.08 3.09 3.09 3.11 
                                                        
  Calculated as follows: each school’s median LSAT is multiplied by its number of matriculating students; the sum of these is then divided by total 
number of matriculants from all schools. The same method is used for weighted average scores on 25th and 75th percentiles, as well as for all three 
GPA metrics. 
129  Scaled LSAT scores were converted to percentile ranks utilizing data from LSAT Percentiles Table, supra note 60. The scale-to-percentile con-
version varies very slightly over the 6-year period; in particular, some scaled scores convert to a slightly higher percentile in later years, reflecting an 
overall reduction in the average test scores from 2010 to 2016. We adjusted our scaled-to-percentile conversions to reflect these changes. 
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TABLE A.I.2: STATISTICS FOR COMPOSITE ENROLLED STUDENTS IN EACH ACADEMIC YEAR, ACROSS ALL PRIVATE LAW SCHOOLS 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total number of enrolled students 90,639 92,634 91,323 86,076 72,721 68,440 66,408 
Annual % change  2% -1% -6% -16% -6% -3% 
Cumulative % change  2% 1% -5% -20% -24% -27% 
        
Total number of students receiving grants 42,805 45,502 44,322 45,326 45,762 46,569 47,279 
Annual % change  6% -3% 2% 1% 2% 2% 
        
Weighted Average Sticker Price130 37,388 39,042 40,440 42,233 43,762 45,041 46,883 
Annual % change  4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 4% 
Cumulate % change  4% 8% 13% 17% 20% 25% 
        
Weighted Average “Net Price”131 31,060 32,008 33,138 33,960 32,445 31,625 31,555 
Annual % change  3% 4% 2% -4% -3% 0% 
Cumulative % change  3% 7% 9% 4% 2% 2% 
        
Discount on Tuition (Sticker Price - Net 
Price) 
6,329 7,034 7,302 8,273 11,318 13,417 15,328 
Annual % change  11% 4% 13% 37% 19% 14% 
        
Total Revenue across all schools ($ Millions) 2,815 2,965 3,026 2,923 2,359 2,164 2,096 
Annual % change  5% 2% -3% -19% -8% -3% 
Cumulative % change  5% 7% 4% -16% -23% -26% 
                                                        
130  WA Sticker Price = i(Net Pricei, * # enrolledi) / i(# enrolled) for all schools i. 
131  “Net Price” for each school is calculated as Quoted Price less the Median Grant multiplied by percentage of enrolled students receiving grants. 
Equivalently: Net Price = Sticker Price - (Median Grant * # getting grants / # enrolled). 
Weighted Average Net Price is calculated as follows: each school’s Net Price is multiplied by its # enrolled students; the sum of all of these is then 
divided by total # of enrolled students. 
Equivalently: WA Net Price = i(Net Pricei, * # enrolledi) / i(# enrolled) for all schools i. 
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TABLE A.I.3: TUITION RELATED STATISTICS FOR COMPOSITE ENROLLED STUDENTS IN EACH ACADEMIC YEAR, ACROSS ALL PRIVATE LAW 
SCHOOLS, REPORTED IN 2018 DOLLARS132 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Weighted Average Sticker Price133 42,434 43,154 43,546 44,817 45,749 47,119 49,007 
Annual % change  2% 1% 3% 2% 3% 4% 
Cumulative % change  2% 3% 6% 8% 11% 15% 
        
Weighted Average “Net Price”134 35,251 35,379 35,683 36,037 33,918 33,084 32,985 
Annual % change  0% 1% 1% -6% -2% 0% 
Cumulative % change  0% 1% 2% -4% -6% -6% 
        
Discount on Tuition (Sticker Price - Net 
Price) 
7,183 7,775 7,863 8,779 11,831 14,036 16,022 
Annual % change  8% 1% 12% 35% 19% 14% 
        
Total Revenue across all schools ($ Millions) 3,195 3,277 3,259 3,102 2,467 2,264 2,190 
Annual % change  3% -1% -5% -20% -8% -3% 
Cumulative % change  3% 2% -3% -23% -29% -31% 
                                                        
132  Adjusted for inflation using CPI data. See Robert Shiller, Online Data, YALE U., http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm [https://perma.cc/5T 
FB-NBVA] (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
133  See supra note 130. 
134  See supra note 131. 
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TABLE A.I.4: COMPOSITE MATRICULATING CLASS IN EACH YEAR, ACROSS PRIVATE LAW SCHOOLS: TOP 37 SCHOOLS 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total Applications 188,918 165,305 146,966 131,488 130,725 124,720 130,978 
Annual % change  -12% -11% -11% -1% -5% 5% 
5- & 6-year % change from 2010      -34% -31% 
        
Total Matriculants 11,101 10,508 9,915 9,604 9,699 9,353 9,633 
Annual % change  -5% -6% -3% 1% -4% 3% 
5- & 6-year % change from 2010      -16% -13% 
        
Weighted average median LSAT 166 166 165 164 164 163 163 
Weighted average median percentile LSAT 93 93 91 90 90 87 87 
Weighted average median GPA 3.64 3.64 3.63 3.63 3.62 3.63 3.64 
        
Weighted average 75th centile LSAT 168 167 167 166 166 166 166 
Weighted average 75th centile LSAT (percen-
tiles) 
96 94 94 93 93 93 93 
Weighted average 75th centile GPA 3.77 3.77 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.76 3.77 
        
Weighted average 25th centile LSAT 163 162 162 161 160 160 160 
Weighted average 25th centile LSAT (percen-
tiles) 
87 85 85 83 80 80 80 
Weighted average 25th centile GPA 3.41 3.41 3.39 3.39 3.39 3.39 3.40 
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TABLE A.I.5: STATISTICS FOR COMPOSITE ENROLLED STUDENTS IN EACH ACADEMIC YEAR: TOP 37 SCHOOLS 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total number of enrolled students 33,513 33,994 33,642 32,733 30,392 29,893 29,895 
Annual % change  1% -1% -3% -7% -2% 0% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       -11% 
        
Total number receiving grants 17,406 18,111 18,113 18,160 19,498 20,364 21,535 
% students receiving grants 52% 53% 54% 55% 64% 68% 72% 
        
Weighted Average Sticker Price 43,372 45,150 46,762 48,833 50,728 52,191 54,143 
Annual % change  4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 4% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       25% 
        
Weighted Average “Net Price” 35,056 35,892 37,167 38,160 36,789 36,400 36,135 
Annual % change  2% 4% 3% -4% -1% -1% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       3% 
        
Weighted Average Discount on Tuition 8,316 9,258 9,595 10,674 13,939 15,791 18,008 
Annual % change  11% 4% 11% 31% 13% 14% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       117% 
        
Total Revenue across all schools ($ Millions) 1,175 1,220 1,250 1,249 1,118 1,088 1,080 
Annual % change  4% 2% 0% -10% -3% -1% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       -8% 
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TABLE A.I.6: TUITION RELATED STATISTICS FOR COMPOSITE ENROLLED STUDENTS IN EACH ACADEMIC YEAR, REPORTED IN 2018 DOLLARS135: 
TOP 37 SCHOOLS 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Weighted Average Sticker Price 49,225 49,905 50,352 51,821 53,032 54,599 56,595 
Annual % change  1% 1% 3% 2% 3% 4% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       15% 
        
Weighted Average “Net Price” 39,787 39,672 40,020 40,495 38,460 38,079 37,772 
Annual % change  0% 1% 1% -5% -1% -1% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       -5% 
        
Weighted Average Discount on Tuition 9,438 10,233 10,332 11,327 14,572 16,520 18,823 
Annual % change  8% 1% 10% 29% 13% 14% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       99% 
        
Total Revenue across all schools ($ Millions) 1,333 1,349 1,346 1,326 1,169 1,138 1,129 
Annual % change  1% 0% -2% -12% -3% -1% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       -15% 
                                                        
135  Adjusted for inflation using CPI data. See Shiller, supra note 132. 
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TABLE A.I.7: COMPOSITE MATRICULATING CLASS IN EACH YEAR, ACROSS PRIVATE LAW SCHOOLS: MIDDLE 36 SCHOOLS 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total Applications 85,824 78,307 67,457 50,886 43,026 42,674 41,099 
Annual % change  -9% -14% -25% -15% -1% -4% 
5- & 6-year % change from 2010      -50% -52% 
        
Total Matriculants 9,683 8,756 7,875 6,853 6,488 6,498 6,581 
Annual % change  -10% -10% -13% -5% 0% 1% 
5- & 6-year % change from 2010      -33% -32% 
        
Weighted average median LSAT 157 156 155 154 153 153 153 
Weighted average median percentile LSAT 70 67 63 60 56 56 56 
Weighted average median GPA 3.37 3.35 3.32 3.30 3.30 3.29 3.31 
        
Weighted average 75th centile LSAT 159 159 158 157 156 156 156 
Weighted average 75th centile LSAT (percen-
tiles) 
77 77 74 70 67 67 67 
Weighted average 75th centile GPA 3.59 3.56 3.56 3.53 3.53 3.52 3.55 
        
Weighted average 25th centile LSAT 154 153 152 151 150 150 150 
Weighted average 25th centile LSAT (percen-
tiles) 
60 56 52 48 44 44 44 
Weighted average 25th centile GPA 3.09 3.08 3.05 3.02 3.02 3.01 3.02 
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TABLE A.I.8: STATISTICS FOR COMPOSITE ENROLLED STUDENTS IN EACH ACADEMIC YEAR: MIDDLE 36 SCHOOLS 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total number of enrolled students 28,170 28,335 27,693 25,575 20,924 19,640 19,158 
Annual % change  1% -2% -8% -18% -6% -2% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       -32% 
        
Total number receiving grants 12,800 13,966 13,069 13,955 13,318 13,960 14,311 
% students receiving grants 45% 49% 47% 55% 64% 71% 75% 
        
Weighted Average Sticker Price 36,477 38,202 39,499 40,589 41,236 42,169 43,520 
Annual % change  5% 3% 3% 2% 2% 3% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       19% 
        
Weighted Average “Net Price” 30,179 30,986 32,216 32,130 29,991 27,968 37,661 
Annual % change  3% 4% 0% -7% -7% -1% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       -8% 
        
Weighted Average Discount on Tuition 6,298 7,217 7,283 8,459 11,245 14,201 15,859 
Annual % change  15% 1% 16% 33% 26% 12% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       152% 
        
Total Revenue across all schools ($ Millions) 850 878 892 822 628 549 530 
Annual % change  3% 2% -8% -24% -12% -4% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       -38% 
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TABLE A.I.9: TUITION RELATED STATISTICS FOR COMPOSITE ENROLLED STUDENTS IN EACH ACADEMIC YEAR, REPORTED IN 2018 DOLLARS136: 
MIDDLE 36 SCHOOLS 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Weighted Average Sticker Price 41,400 42,226 42,532 43,073 43,109 44,115 45,492 
Annual % change  2% 1% 1% 0% 2% 3% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       10% 
        
Weighted Average “Net Price” 34,252 34,249 34,690 34,096 31,353 29,258 28,914 
Annual % change  0% 1% -2% -8% -7% -1% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       -16% 
        
Weighted Average Discount on Tuition 7,148 7,977 7,843 8,977 11,756 14,857 16,577 
Annual % change  12% -2% 14% 31% 26% 12% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       132% 
        
Total Revenue across all schools ($ Millions) 965 970 961 872 656 575 554 
Annual % change  1% -1% -9% -25% -12% -4% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       -43% 
                                                        
136  Adjusted for inflation using CPI data. See Shiller, supra note 132. 
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TABLE A.I.10: COMPOSITE MATRICULATING CLASS IN EACH YEAR, ACROSS PRIVATE LAW SCHOOLS: BOTTOM 37 SCHOOLS 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total Applications 61,709 55,964 48,839 35,867 31,057 28,358 27,166 
Annual % change  -9% -13% -27% -13% -9% -4% 
5- & 6-year % change from 2010      -54% -56% 
        
Total Matriculants 11,757 10,427 9,110 7,994 7,077 6,502 6,173 
Annual % change  -11% -13% -12% -11% -8% -5% 
5- & 6-year % change from 2010      -45% -47% 
        
Weighted average median LSAT 151 150 149 148 147 147 147 
Weighted average median percentile LSAT 48 44 40 37 34 34 34 
Weighted average median GPA 3.13 3.12 3.10 3.07 3.05 3.04 3.07 
        
Weighted average 75th centile LSAT 154 153 153 152 151 151 151 
Weighted average 75th centile LSAT (percen-
tiles) 
60 56 56 52 48 48 48 
Weighted average 75th centile GPA 3.42 3.40 3.39 3.36 3.35 3.35 3.35 
        
Weighted average 25th centile LSAT 148 148 146 145 145 145 145 
Weighted average 25th centile LSAT (percen-
tiles) 
37 37 30 27 27 27 27 
Weighted average 25th centile GPA 2.84 2.82 2.80 2.77 2.75 2.73 2.76 
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TABLE A.I.11: STATISTICS FOR COMPOSITE ENROLLED STUDENTS IN EACH ACADEMIC YEAR: BOTTOM 37 SCHOOLS 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total number of enrolled students 28,956 30,305 29,988 27,768 21,405 18,907 17,355 
Annual % change  5% -1% -7% -23% -12% -8% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       -40% 
        
Total number receiving grants 12,599 13,425 13,140 13,211 12,946 12,245 11,433 
% students receiving grants 44% 44% 44% 48% 60% 65% 66% 
        
Weighted Average Sticker Price 31,350 32,977 34,218 35,966 36,340 36,720 38,091 
Annual % change  5% 4% 5% 1% 1% 4% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       22% 
        
Weighted Average “Net Price” 27,291 28,607 29,471 30,694 28,674 27,873 27,964 
Annual % change  5% 3% 4% -7% -3% 0% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       2% 
        
Weighted Average Discount on Tuition 4,059 4,369 4,747 5,272 7,666 8,847 10,127 
Annual % change  8% 9% 11% 45% 15% 14% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       150% 
        
Total Revenue across all schools ($ Millions) 790 867 884 852 614 527 485 
Annual % change  10% 2% -4% -28% -14% -8% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       -39% 
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TABLE A.I.12: TUITION RELATED STATISTICS FOR COMPOSITE ENROLLED STUDENTS IN EACH ACADEMIC YEAR, REPORTED IN 2018 
DOLLARS137: BOTTOM 37 SCHOOLS 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Weighted Average Sticker Price 35,580 36,450 36,846 38,166 37,990 38,414 39,817 
Annual % change  2% 1% 4% 0% 1% 4% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       12% 
        
Weighted Average “Net Price” 30,974 31,620 31,734 32,572 29,976 29,159 29,231 
Annual % change  2% 0% 3% -8% -3% 0% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       -6% 
        
Weighted Average Discount on Tuition 4,606 4,829 5,112 5,594 8,014 9,256 10,585 
Annual % change  5% 6% 9% 43% 15% 14% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       130% 
        
Total Revenue across all schools ($ Millions) 897 958 952 904 642 551 507 
Annual % change  7% -1% -5% -29% -14% 8% 
6-year % change, 2010–16       -43% 
                                                        
137  Adjusted for inflation using CPI data. See Shiller, supra note 132. 
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APPENDIX II: COMPARISON OF SAMPLE WITH ALL ACCREDITED LAW SCHOOLS 
TABLE A.II.1: COMPARISON BETWEEN ALL PUBLIC & PRIVATE LAW SCHOOLS (N = 188) AND PRIVATE ONLY LAW SCHOOLS (N = 110) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total Applications—all schools 593,862 524,430 458,342 375,485 344,657 329,543 335,485 
Annual % change  -12% -13% -18% -8% -4% 2% 
Ratio: private schools vs all schools 57% 57% 57% 58% 59% 59% 59% 
        
Total Matriculants—all schools 48,323 44,418 40,479 37,219 35,504 34,621 34,631 
Annual % change  -8% -9% -8% -5% -2% 0% 
Ratio: private schools vs all schools 67% 67% 66% 66% 66% 65% 65% 
        
Weighted average median LSAT—all school  158 158 157 157 156 156 157 
Weighted average median percentile LSAT—
all schools 
74 70 70 67 67 67 67 
Weighted average median GPA—all schools 3.42 3.41 3.40 3.39 3.39 3.39 3.42 
        
Weighted average median LSAT—private 
schools 
158 157 157 156 156 156 156 
Weighted average median percentile LSAT—
private schools 
74 70 70 67 67 67 67 
Weighted average median GPA—private 
schools 
3.38 3.37 3.36 3.35 3.36 3.36 3.39 
TABLE A.II.2: COMPARISON BETWEEN ALL PUBLIC & PRIVATE LAW SCHOOLS (N = 188) AND PRIVATE ONLY LAW SCHOOLS (N = 110) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total number of enrolled students 137,274 140,282 137,548 130,400 119,178 111,339 106,170 
Annual % change  2% -2% -5% -9% -7% -5% 
Ratio of private schools to all schools 66% 66% 66% 66% 61% 61% 63% 
 
